St. John's University School of Law

St. John's Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
2019

Facebook v. Sullivan: Public Figures and Newsworthiness in
Online Speech
Thomas E. Kadri
Kate Klonick
St. John's University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the First Amendment Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

FACEBOOK V. SULLIVAN: PUBLIC
FIGURES AND NEWSWORTHINESS IN
ONLINE SPEECH
THOMAS E. KADRI* & KATE KLONICK†
In the United States, there are now two systems to adjudicate disputes
about harmful speech. The first is older and more established: the legal
system in which judges apply constitutional law to limit tort claims alleging
injuries caused by speech. The second is newer and less familiar: the
content-moderation system in which platforms like Facebook implement the
rules that govern online speech. These platforms are not bound by the First
Amendment. But, as it turns out, they rely on many of the tools used by courts
to resolve tensions between regulating harmful speech and preserving free
expression—particularly the entangled concepts of “public figures” and
“newsworthiness.”
This Article offers the first empirical analysis of how judges and content
moderators have used these two concepts to shape the boundaries of free
speech. It first introduces the legal doctrines developed by the “Old
Governors,” exploring how courts have shaped the constitutional concepts
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of public figures and newsworthiness in the face of tort claims for
defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The Article then turns to the “New Governors” and examines how
Facebook’s content-moderation system channeled elements of the courts’
reasoning for imposing First Amendment limits on tort liability.
By exposing the similarities and differences between how the two
systems have understood these concepts, this Article offers lessons for both
courts and platforms as they confront new challenges posed by online
speech. It exposes the pitfalls of using algorithms to identify public figures;
explores the diminished utility of setting rules based on voluntary
involvement in public debate; and analyzes the dangers of ad hoc and
unaccountable newsworthiness determinations. Both courts and platforms
must adapt to the new speech ecosystem that companies like Facebook have
helped create, particularly the way that viral content has shifted normative
intuitions about who deserves harsher rules in disputes about harmful
speech, be it in law or content moderation.
Finally, the Article concludes by exploring what this comparison
reveals about the structural role platforms play in today’s speech ecosystem
and how it illuminates new solutions. These platforms act as legislature,
executive, judiciary, and press—but without any separation of powers to
establish checks and balances. A change to this model is already occurring
at one platform: Facebook is creating a new Oversight Board that will
hopefully provide due process to users on the platform’s speech decisions
and transparency about how content-moderation policy is made, including
how concepts related to newsworthiness and public figures are applied.
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2017, a group of American neo-Nazis convened for a
“Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. Amid scenes of chaos,
James Alex Fields drove his car through a crowd and killed a young counterprotestor, Heather Heyer. The next day, a blog post from the white
supremacist website, The Daily Stormer, was shared over 65,000 times on
Facebook: “Heather Heyer, Woman Killed in Road Rage Incident was a Fat,
Childless 32-Year-Old Slut.”1 To some, this post looked like provocative but
permissible commentary about someone who was now newsworthy; to
others, it seemed like harmful speech that Facebook should remove as a
violation of its internal rules.2 When people complained about the post,
Facebook’s rulemakers debated: Should it stay up or come down?
Ultimately, they hedged. The platform removed every link to the post unless
the user included a caption condemning The Daily Stormer.3
This episode reveals something important about free speech in the
digital age: the judiciary is no longer the only actor that adjudicates claims
about harmful speech. In the United States, we now have two systems to
adjudicate these disputes. The first is older and more established: the legal
system in which judges apply constitutional law to limit tort claims alleging
injuries caused by harmful speech.4 The second is newer and less familiar:
1. Talia Lavin, The Neo-Nazis of The Daily Stormer Wander the Digital Wilderness, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/the-neo-nazis-of-thedaily-stormer-wander-the-digital-wilderness [https://perma.cc/8XL7-UYKV]; see also Casey Newton,
Facebook Is Deleting Links to a Viral Attack on a Charlottesville Victim, THE VERGE (Aug. 14, 2017,
8:30 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/14/16147126/facebook-delete-viral-post-charlottesvilledaily-stormer [https://perma.cc/JLF2-AT2G].
2. See Julia Angwin et al., Have You Experienced Hate Speech on Facebook? We Want to Hear
from You., PROPUBLICA (Aug. 29, 2017, 10:05 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/have-youexperienced-hate-speech-on-facebook-we-want-to-hear-from-you [https://perma.cc/A8PF-MC4U].
3. Newton, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 381 (1967) (privacy); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (defamation). On the history and complications of constitutionalizing tort law,
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the content-moderation system in which platforms like Facebook implement
the rules that govern online speech.5 These platforms aren’t bound by the
First Amendment. But, as it turns out, they rely on many of the tools used by
courts to resolve tensions between regulating harmful speech and preserving
free expression—particularly the entangled concepts of “public figures” and
“newsworthiness.”
This Article analyzes how judges and content moderators have used
these two concepts to shape the boundaries of free speech. By exposing the
similarities and differences between how the two systems have understood
these concepts, this Article offers lessons for both courts and platforms as
they confront new challenges posed by online speech. Finally, the Article
briefly explores how this comparison reveals the structural changes that
platforms like Facebook should make to address these challenges and bring
oversight to their governance of online speech.
Part I introduces the legal doctrines developed by the “Old Governors,”
exploring how courts have shaped the concepts of public figures and
newsworthiness in the face of tort claims for defamation, invasion of privacy,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Part II turns to the “New
Governors” and examines Facebook’s content-moderation system. Drawing
on internal Facebook documents and several years of exclusive interviews
with current and former Facebook employees, this Part reveals for the first
time how and why the platform created its own rules related to public figures
and newsworthiness. In so doing, it shows that Facebook’s rulemaking—
consciously or unconsciously—channeled elements of the courts’ reasoning
when imposing First Amendment limits on tort liability.
see Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 1650, 1672–84 (2009); Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original Meaning of the Freedom of
Speech, Press, and Petition, 96 IOWA L. REV. 249, 251–54 (2010).
5. For foundational work on the development of the idea of private governance by speech
platforms, see REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED 149–65 (2012) (analyzing
platforms through the lens of “governance” at the “new digital sovereigns” of “Facebookistan” and
“Googledom”); see also Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807, 1819–22 (2012);
Robert Gorwa, What is Platform Governance?, 22 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 854, 854 (2019); Kate Klonick,
The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV.
1598, 1616–18 (2018); Thomas Kadri, How Supreme a Court?, SLATE (Nov. 19, 2018, 1:59 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/11/facebook-zuckerberg-independent-speech-content-appealscourt.html [https://perma.cc/524G-QYLJ] [hereinafter Kadri, How Supreme a Court?]; Thomas Kadri,
Speech vs. Speakers, SLATE (Jan. 18, 2018, 12:56 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/01/twittersnew-rules-blur-the-line-between-extremists-speakers-and-their-speech.html [https://perma.cc/JW9B-FF
Q6] [hereinafter Kadri, Speech vs. Speakers]; Kate Klonick & Thomas Kadri, Opinion, How to Make
Facebook’s ‘Supreme Court’ Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
11/17/opinion/facebook-supreme-court-speech.html [https://perma.cc/DRD4-N8AK].
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Guided by this background, Part III exposes the similarities and
differences between how the private and public governance systems have
understood the concepts of public figures and newsworthiness. Through this
comparative analysis, this Part addresses how both courts and platforms
should confront new challenges posed by online speech. Judges and platform
policymakers must adapt to the new speech ecosystem that companies like
Facebook have helped create, particularly the way that virality has shifted
normative intuitions about who deserves harsher rules in disputes about
harmful speech, be it in constitutional law or content moderation. 6 This Part
first exposes the pitfalls of using algorithms to identify public figures,
critiquing Facebook’s use of online news aggregators and news sources to
determine public-figure status on the platform—a mechanism that results in
Facebook removing too much benign speech and preserving too much
harmful speech. It then explains how the internet has eroded traditional
reasons for specially protecting speech about public figures because these
reasons rest principally on assumptions that people become public figures by
choice and that, as public figures, they have greater access to channels of
rebuttal.7 These assumptions are becoming increasingly outdated in the
digital age, given the dynamics of online speech8 and the ubiquity of means
to engage in counter-speech.9 As a result, this Part reassesses the normative
utility of distinguishing between “voluntary” and “involuntary” public
figures to judge who deserves harsher rules in courts and on platforms,
discussing the alternative use of “sympathy” as a normative barometer.
Lastly, this Part assesses the risks posed by platforms creating ad hoc
exceptions for newsworthy content. Although there are significant
advantages to increasing human review in content moderation, the current
6. See generally THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 3−6 (1970)
(developing the idea of the First Amendment creating a “system” of free speech).
7. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 154 (1967).
8. See DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 11–12
(2014) (explaining how social media creates new challenges because of the “persistence,” “visibility,”
“spreadability,” and “searchability” of content); Kate Klonick, Re-Shaming the Debate: Social Norms,
Shame, and Regulation in an Internet Age, 75 MD. L. REV. 1029, 1053–54 (2015) (describing how the
internet changes social norm enforcement by eliminating frictions of time, geography, personal reputation
and cost). See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) (describing
cyber harassment and exploring ways to combat it); Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech
Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296 (2014) (discussing the changing approach to speech regulation).
9. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1833 (1995)
(predicting, even before the advent of social media, that new technologies would “both democratize the
information marketplace—make it more accessible to comparatively poor speakers as well as rich ones—
and diversify it”); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 19 (2006); Jack M. Balkin, Digital
Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004).
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structure of most platforms means that decisions in this area lack
transparency, expertise, and consistency.
This Article concludes by looking briefly at the Facebook Oversight
Board, an independent institution that Facebook is currently creating to
provide users with transparency and procedure around content moderation.
Ideally, such a Board will provide users with explanation and consistency
around how the concepts of newsworthiness and public figures are applied.
This institution may ultimately result in users gaining procedural and
structural protections in the new, private system regulating their expression.
The Article concludes that more platforms should adopt such oversight
mechanisms to protect users’ speech rights and provide accountability,
transparency, and due process.
I. PUBLIC FIGURES AND NEWSWORTHINESS IN OLD
GOVERNANCE: TORT LAW AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN
THE COURTS
Within the vast world of tort law, which aims to provide relief when
people are harmed, are what Jack Balkin calls “communications torts.”10
Communications torts are “a category of legal causes of action in which
people are harmed by speech acts of others.”11 The concept of
communications torts is particularly salient in the digital age because, as
Balkin foresaw, “all activity in virtual worlds must begin as a form of
speech” such that “[w]hen people injure each other in virtual worlds in ways
that the law will recognize, they are almost always committing some form of
communications tort.”12
Unsurprisingly, then, legal claims involving communications torts will
often implicate the First Amendment because they are premised on harms
caused by speech. When adjudicating these claims, the Supreme Court has
looked at whether the claimant is a public figure or whether the underlying
speech is newsworthy. This Part focuses on how the concepts of public
figures and newsworthiness have curtailed three communications torts:
defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. By unfolding the history and underlying rationales of the Court’s
First Amendment doctrine in this area, this Part provides context for Part II’s
exploration of how Facebook developed its own rules surrounding these
10.
11.
12.

Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 73 (2004).
Id.
Id.
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same concepts. As we will see in Part III, although these public and private
doctrines evolved in seemingly disparate contexts, they share many
similarities—and, in a new era of online speech, some critical differences. 13
A. DEFAMATION
The tort of defamation has played a central role in the development of
First Amendment law. Although liability for false speech that injures
someone’s reputation was long thought to raise no constitutional concern,
the Supreme Court eventually developed an intricate web of rules to restrain
the reach of defamation and protect free speech. The story begins in March
1960 when L.B. Sullivan, an elected commissioner from Alabama, sued the
New York Times for defamation after the newspaper published an
advertisement criticizing the Montgomery Police Department’s treatment of
civil-rights demonstrators.14 Sullivan claimed that the advertisement
contained falsehoods that damaged his reputation. His case made it all the
way to the Supreme Court.15
In addressing the threshold issue in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,16
Justice William Brennan explained that torts like defamation “can claim no
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations” and “must be measured
by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”17 Although he
acknowledged that the advertisement contained falsehoods, he explained that
“erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate” and “must be protected if
the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they
‘need . . . to survive.’”18 Defamation claims, he said, cannot create an
environment that “dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public
debate.”19 To address this concern, the Court crafted a special constitutional
rule: public figures alleging defamation must prove that the offending
statements were made with “actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that the
statement “was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
13.
14.

Id. at 73–76.
LEE LEVINE & STEPHEN WERMIEL, THE PROGENY: JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN’S FIGHT TO
PRESERVE THE LEGACY OF NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN 3–4 (2014).
15. See generally id. (providing an excellent account of this historic case); KERMIT L. HALL &
MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW, AND THE FREE PRESS
(2011) (same); Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Story of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, in FIRST
AMENDMENT STORIES 229 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012) (same).
16. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17. Id. at 269.
18. Id. at 271–72 (first alteration in original) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).
19. Id. at 279.
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not.”20
The justices in Sullivan identified two justifications for creating this
constitutional hurdle for public figures. The central reason—one that Justice
Brennan discussed at length in the majority opinion—was the democratic
imperative of preserving “debate on public issues.”21 This rationale reflects
a theory of the First Amendment grounded in democratic self-governance.
Various scholars have shaped the contours of this theory and glossed it in
different ways,22 but a central concern for many of them is the public’s need
to have the information necessary to engage in self-government.23 Under this
rationale, the First Amendment protects the public’s entitlement “to all
information that is necessary for informed governance” because “the public,
in its role as the electorate, [is] ultimately responsible for political
decisions.”24 The self-governance theory is often cached out in these
“educative” terms by justifying “speech protection not because of any
individual right of expression but instead because of the need to create an
informed public.”25
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 279–80.
Id. at 270.
Compare, e.g., A LEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948) (developing a listener-focused account for the relationship between free speech
and self-government through the idea of the educative function of a town meeting), with ROBERT C. POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995) (developing a speakerfocused account that connects free speech and self-government by exploring the legitimating function
served by public discourse).
23. See generally Thomas E. Kadri, Drawing Trump Naked: Curbing the Right of Publicity to
Protect Public Discourse, 78 MD. L. REV. 899, 905 (2019) (discussing theorists who hold this view and
dubbing them “educative” theorists).
24. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law
Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 999 (1989).
25. Kadri, supra note 23, at 913; see also OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 13 (1996) (attesting that “[w]e allow people to speak so
others can vote” because “[s]peech allows people to vote intelligently and freely, aware of all the options
and in possession of all the relevant information”); A LEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 55 (1960) (arguing that the First Amendment “has no concern
about the ‘needs of many men to express their opinions’” but rather is concerned with “the common needs
of all the members of the body politic”); id. at 56–57, 61 (criticizing Zechariah Chafee, Jr.’s “inclusion
of an individual interest within the scope of the First Amendment,” and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s
“excessive individualism” on this front); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 1405, 1409–10 (1986) (arguing that “[t]he purpose of free speech is not individual self-actualization,
but rather the preservation of democracy, and the right of a people, as a people, to decide what kind of
life it wishes to live”); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 786 (1987) (framing the
individual speech right in instrumental terms, worthy of protection “only when it enriches public debate”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 499, 501 (2000) (maintaining that
the primary purpose of free speech is to promote deliberative democracy— “a system in which citizens
are informed about public issues and able to make judgments on the basis of reasons”). For some skeptical
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Today, Sullivan is often framed as a case that deals solely with the
importance of speech about “public figures,” but this undervalues its
significance to a much broader doctrine. Justice Brennan’s concern was not
limited to protecting speech about a plaintiff’s political position as a
government official, but rather what the justice called a “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”26 The focus was not simply on
Sullivan’s social status, but also—at least implicitly—on whether the speech
at issue related to issues that the public needed to know in order to selfgovern. The question whether a defamation plaintiff is a public figure is part
of a subtler inquiry about whether the speech in question touches on a matter
of public concern.27 As a result, an important part of Sullivan’s legacy is that
it weaved self-governance theory into First Amendment doctrine.
Although the self-governance theory animated the Court’s opinion in
Sullivan, a second rationale for treating public figures differently appeared
in Justice Arthur Goldberg’s concurrence: public figures enjoy “equal if not
greater access than most private citizens to media of communication.”28
Though not part of the majority’s reasoning, this additional justification
eventually animated the development of public-figure doctrine. When a
university athletic director and a prominent political activist sued two
newspapers for defamation in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court
adopted Justice Goldberg’s rationale by justifying its decision on the basis
that plaintiffs “had sufficient access to the means of counterargument” to
rebut the alleged falsehoods.29 The Court also echoed the self-governance
rationale in explaining why Sullivan’s constitutional rule applied to plaintiffs
who were not government officials,30 explaining that the “public interest” in
being informed about nonpolitical public figures was “not less” than being
informed about public officials.31 Thus, although the Court’s holding hinged
on the plaintiffs’ social status, the justification for it was again rooted in the
treatment of these theorists, see J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories,
104 YALE L.J. 1935, 1935–90 (1995); Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the
Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1109–23 (1993).
26. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270
27. See Catherine Hancock, Origins of the Public Figure Doctrine in First Amendment Defamation
Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 85 (2005); Post, supra note 24, at 997.
28. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 304–05 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
29. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 135–41, 155 (1967).
30. Id. at 155.
31. Id. at 154–55; see also id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result) (declaring that
distinguishing between public figures and officials would have “no basis in law, logic, or First
Amendment policy”).
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importance of robust debate on “public issues,”32 as well as the fact that the
plaintiffs could participate in that debate by virtue of their prominence.
Given the Court’s reliance on self-governance theory to protect speech
on “public issues,” one might wonder why the Court focused on the
plaintiff’s status instead of simply asking whether the speech at issue was
necessary for the public to know. The Court flirted with such a reformulation
of the doctrine in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., in which a plurality
extended Sullivan’s rule to all defamation claims involving speech on
matters of public concern, regardless of whether the plaintiff was a public or
private figure.33 Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion reasoned that a matter
“of public or general interest . . . cannot suddenly become less so merely
because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the
individual did not ‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved.”34 In his view,
“[t]he public’s primary interest is in the event,” not the individual’s social
status.35 Any interest in the individual’s prominence was merely a corollary
to that primary interest, for “the public focus is on the conduct of the
participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the
participant’s prior anonymity or notoriety.”36 In order to “honor the
commitment to robust debate on public issues . . . embodied in the First
Amendment” that the Court had recognized in Sullivan, Justice Brennan
concluded that the constitutional rule must apply “to all discussion and
communication involving matters of public or general concern, without
regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous,” though
quite what constituted a matter of “public or general concern” was left rather
opaque.37
Rosenbloom’s doctrinal simplicity—if jettisoning the “public figure”
concept for the ambiguous notion of the “public or general concern” can be
considered simplicity—was fleeting. Just three years later, the Court held in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. that Sullivan’s rule should not apply to claims
brought by private figures.38 In drawing lines between public and private
figures, the Court imagined two, and possibly three, types of public
figures: general public figures; limited-purpose public figures; and, perhaps,
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 147.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S 29, 43–44 (1971) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 43.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 43–44.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–48 (1974).
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involuntary public figures.39 General public figures “occupy positions of
such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for
all purposes,”40 while limited-purpose public figures “thrust themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved.”41 Notably, the Court left undefined the
third (possible) type of public figure, observing only that “truly involuntary
public figures must be exceedingly rare.”42 This remark was prophetic: the
Court has never encountered its mythical character in the forty years that
have since passed.43
The demarcation of different types of public figures has developed into
a central concern in the Court’s defamation jurisprudence. In contrast to the
atrophied idea of the involuntary public figure, the Court has developed the
“voluntariness” element at length. In Gertz, the Court explained that both
general and limited-purpose public figures “invite attention and comment”
and thus have “voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood concerning them.”44 Building from this premise,
the Court in Time, Inc. v. Firestone held that a woman who divorced a
member of a wealthy socialite family was not a public figure.45 The Court
cautioned against adopting a concept of public figures that might create too
large a class, and explained that a person needed more than local notoriety
to become a public figure.46 The Court stressed that the divorcée did not
“freely choose to publicize issues as to the propriety of her married life” but
rather was “compelled” to go to court to end her marriage.47 Her actions,
then, were “no more voluntary in a realistic sense” than those of a criminal
defendant “called upon to defend his interests in court.”48 In addition, the
Court refused to equate “public controversy” with “all controversies of
interest to the public” because doing so would reinstate the Rosenbloom rule
39. See W. Wat Hopkins, The Involuntary Public Figure: Not So Dead After All, 21 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 21 (2003) (“[T]here is disagreement as to whether the Supreme Court identified two
or three categories of public figure status.”).
40. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Jeffrey Omar Usman, Finding the Lost Involuntary Public Figure, 2014 UTAH L. REV.
951, 952 (claiming that “involuntary public figures” as category of individuals in First Amendment
defamation jurisprudence “has become lost”).
44. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
45. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424.U.S. 448, 453 (1976).
46. Id. at 450–53.
47. Id. at 454.
48. Id. (citation omitted).
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that disavowed the significance of a plaintiff’s social status.49
Since Firestone, the Court has repeatedly held that individuals who did
not voluntarily garner attention were not public figures. In Wolston v.
Reader’s Digest Association, for example, the Court declined to apply the
label to a witness who missed a grand-jury hearing investigating Cold War
espionage.50 The witness had not “voluntarily thrust” or “injected” himself
into the public eye; rather, the Court declared that “[i]t would be more
accurate to say that [he] was dragged unwillingly into the controversy.”51
Similarly, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, in which a professor sued a U.S.
Senator who criticized him for wasting federal funds, the Court stressed that
the professor remained a private figure because he had not “thrust himself or
his views into public controversy to influence others.”52 The Court rejected
the lower courts’ conclusion that the professor became a public figure in part
because he gained some prominence and access to the media after the
Senator had allegedly defamed him.53 Although various media outlets
reported the professor’s response to the Senator’s criticism, the Court
stressed that the professor “did not have the regular and continuing access to
the media that is one of the accouterments of having become a public
figure.”54 In other words, the controversy itself could not transform the
professor into a public figure simply because he appeared in the news as a
result.
As these cases show, although the Court glossed the public-figure
doctrine with a new taxonomy in Gertz and its progeny, the basic rationales
for affording heightened constitutional protection for speech about public
figures tracked the pair of rationales originally suggested in Sullivan and
Butts. First, speech about public figures requires protection for “debate on
public issues [to] be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”55 The pervasive
power of some people makes their behaviors a matter of public interest, just
as the behaviors of someone who thrusts herself into a public controversy
become a matter of public interest, and the public needs to know about these
behaviors if it is to engage meaningfully in self-governance. Second, public
figures are “less vulnerable to injury from defamatory statements” because
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 166–67 (1979).
Id. at 166.
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979).
Id. at 134–36.
Id. at 136.
N.Y Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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they generally have greater ability to engage in “self-help” by “counter[ing]
criticism and expos[ing] the falsehood and fallacies of defamatory
statements” in the media.56 These dual rationales sustain much of modern
public-figure doctrine to this day.57
It’s crucial to note, however, that the Court’s doctrine also reflects two
caveats to these rationales. The first caveat relates to the significance of the
idea of “voluntariness.” The idea that a person chooses to place herself in the
public eye underlies the “normative consideration”58 that public figures are
“less deserving”59 of protection from defamation because, unlike private
figures, they have “voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood.”60 In striking the balance between protecting
free speech and remedying harmful speech, the Court has continued to cling
to the importance of voluntariness, even when the idea of voluntariness
potentially conflicts with the public-figure doctrine’s embrace of selfgovernance theory and its assertion that private figures lack the means of
rebuttal. After all, the fact that a plaintiff freely chose to enter the public
arena might not mean that he or she commands more public interest or that
he or she has greater access to the media—private figures might get caught
up in events that raise issues of great importance to the public, and the
attention that flows from these events might furnish these private figures
with ample opportunity to respond in the media. Nonetheless, the Court has
embraced this doctrinal tension to date.
The second caveat to the rationales developed in Sullivan and Butts
concerns the Rosenbloom retraction in Gertz. The Rosenbloom plurality had
sought to abandon distinctions based on social status,61 and even based on
voluntariness,62 but the Court in Gertz clawed back the significance of both
distinctions in the constitutional analysis. Had the Court’s sole concern been
to preserve “debate on public issues,” Rosenbloom’s rule would have carried
the day, for Justice Brennan was surely right when he observed in
56. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 164.
57. See generally Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Ben Zion Lahav, Public Interest vs. Private Lives—
Affording Public Figures Privacy in the Digital Era: The Three Principle Filtering Model, 19 J. CONST.
L. 975, 983–84 (2017) (outlining the various components of the Court’s public-figure doctrine as (1)
“access and control over the media”; (2) “enrollment in a special role in the public eye”; (3) “willingly
(voluntarily) choosing to engage in a public role, inviting invasion of privacy risks”; and (4) “public
controversy”).
58. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 164.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
61. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S 29, 43–44 (1971).
62. Id. at 43.
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Rosenbloom that matters of public concern “cannot suddenly become less so
merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense
the individual did not ‘voluntarily’ choose to become involved.”63 Yet
despite this fact, the Court chose not to embrace a more speech-protective
rule that would cover all speech on matters of public concern. Gertz and later
cases recognized the fundamental importance of free speech, but the Court
has nonetheless insisted upon a different constitutional regime for private
figures.
These two caveats reveal something important about the balance that
the Court has struck between preserving free speech and protecting people
from harmful speech. In the context of false and defamatory speech, the
Court has developed a constitutional commitment that the First Amendment
must limit tort liability in order to protect robust public debate. But the Court
has also recognized that the public’s eagerness to engage in such debate is
not always sufficient to override all attempts to tackle harmful speech
through defamation law. As the next section reveals, the Court has struck a
different balance when faced with other tort claims that raise free-speech
concerns.
B. INVASION OF PRIVACY
Given the distinctions drawn in defamation law between private and
public figures and matters of private and public concern, it is unsurprising
that privacy law has attracted similar constitutional concepts. Like the
defamation tort, privacy torts often involve allegations that a speech act has
caused harm to someone, and thus these claims regularly implicate the First
Amendment. After Sullivan constitutionalized defamation law through the
public-figure doctrine, defendants in privacy actions began raising
arguments that similar limitations should be placed on privacy torts in order
to preserve free speech. The resulting doctrine borrows heavily from the
Court’s defamation jurisprudence but differs in important respects.
Just a few years after Sullivan, the Court applied “the First Amendment
principles pronounced in [Sullivan]” within the privacy realm in Time, Inc.
v. Hill,64 partially migrating Sullivan’s rule outside the defamation context
for the first time. The case developed after James Hill and his family were
63. Id. at 43–44.
64. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967); see also Hancock, supra note 27, at 105–12
(discussing the relationship of Hill to Sullivan).
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held hostage by escaped convicts.65 Hill sued Life Magazine after it
published an article suggesting that a new play portrayed his family’s story.66
Although he maintained that the article was “false and untrue,”67 his claim
sounded not in defamation but in the privacy tort of unreasonably placing a
person in a “false light” before the public.68 Hill argued that he was not a
public figure but a private citizen who had “involuntarily become
newsworthy” after he and his family were victims of a crime.69
Justice Brennan again delivered the Court’s opinion, stressing—as he
had done in Sullivan—that “[f]reedom of discussion . . . must embrace all
issues about which information is needed.”70 Foreshadowing an issue that
would become crucial in the Court’s defamation jurisprudence, Justice
Brennan declined to base a constitutional rule on “the distinction . . . between
the relative opportunities of the public official and the private individual to
rebut” harmful speech.71 Indeed, he eschewed consideration of the plaintiff’s
social status entirely, as he would later attempt to do in Rosenbloom. He
focused instead on the need to preserve debate on “matters of public
interest”72 and, in so doing, “declared an expansive view of the First
Amendment as protection for all newsworthy material,”73 regardless of
whether the plaintiff is a private figure.74 The decision reflected the selfgovernance theory of the First Amendment, justified as it was by the fact that
the Hill’s ordeal concerned “issues about which information is needed” for
the public to govern itself effectively.75
Hill gave constitutional weight to an idea that had deep foundations in
privacy law. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s seminal work advocating
for a vigorous right to privacy nonetheless stressed that such a right should
65. Hill, 385 U.S. at 378.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A, 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
69. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts and Walker,
1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 279.
70. Hill, 385 U.S. at 388 (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 391.
72. See id. at 387–88 (“We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude
the application of the New York statute to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence
of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of
the truth.”).
73. Samantha Barbas, When Privacy Almost Won: Time, Inc. v. Hill, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 505,
508 (2015).
74. Hill, 385 U.S. at 387–88.
75. Id. at 388 (citation omitted).
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not prohibit speech on matters “of public or general interest,”76 and the first
decision acknowledging a right of privacy contained a similar
qualification.77 Sometimes referred to as speech that’s “newsworthy,”78
speech on matters of public concern is said to lie “at the core of the First
Amendment”79 for reasons that self-governance theorists have detailed at
length.80
The privacy tort of public disclosure of private facts has also been
cabined by constitutional concerns for free speech. As with the false-light
privacy claim in Hill, there can be no liability under the disclosure tort when
the speech in question is of “legitimate public concern.”81 But while the Hill
Court seemed ambivalent to the plaintiff’s status, courts have superficially
entertained a distinction between private and public figures who bring
disclosure claims. As an initial matter, this is because people live much of
their lives out in the open; as a result, the disclosure tort will often be
inapplicable because many facts about people are not truly “private.”82 A
complication arises, however, when people seek to shield certain aspects of
their lives from public view: whereas private figures might rely on the
disclosure tort, the “legitimate interest of the public” may extend “to some
reasonable extent” to facts about public figures “that would otherwise be
purely private.”83
76. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214
(1890).
77. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga. 1905) (“The truth may be spoken,
written, or printed about all matters of a public nature, as well as matters of a private nature in which the
public has a legitimate interest.”); see also Post, supra note 24, at 996.
78. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 400 (1967) (Black, J., concurring); see also FLA. STAT.
§ 90.5015(1)(b) (2017) (“‘News’ means information of public concern relating to local, statewide,
national, or worldwide issues or events.”); Kadri, supra note 23, at 912–13; Mary-Rose Papandrea,
Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 578–81 (2007) (observing that
the newsworthiness standard “involves essentially the same inquiry as a ‘public concern’ test”).
79. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (“[E]xpression on public issues ‘has always rested on the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values.’” (citation omitted)); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y.,
519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997) (“Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms
of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment . . . .”).
80. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 121–65
(1993); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20–35
(1971); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (noting that this rule
applies as a matter of both common law and constitutional law).
82. Id. § 652D cmt. e.
83. Id. § 652D cmt. f; see also id. § 652D cmt. h (noting that interest about a public figure “may
legitimately extend, to some reasonable degree, to further information concerning the individual and to
facts about him, which are not public and which, in the case of one who had not become a public figure,
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Although courts recognize the concept of the public figure under the
disclosure tort, they do not discriminate between the voluntary and
involuntary public figure as they do in defamation law. The Restatement
does draw a distinction between voluntary and involuntary public figures,
but it is a distinction without a doctrinal difference.84 The involuntary public
figure is an enigmatic and elusive character in defamation law,85 but in
privacy law she is pervasive: she is the person who commits a crime or is
accused of it,86 she is the victim or witness of crime and catastrophe,87 and
she is even the hapless soul who inadvertently gets caught up in “events that
attract public attention.”88 Thus, even if she does nothing to “thrust” herself
voluntarily into the vortex of a public controversy, the involuntary public
figure is “properly subject to the public interest” and subject to the same
constitutional rules as those who freely enter the public arena. 89 Her desire
to avoid the limelight is irrelevant, as is her lack of access to the media as a
means of engaging in counter-speech.90
This complex web of considerations creates a paradoxically simple rule:
there is no privacy invasion when the fact disclosed is of “legitimate public
concern.” This is true for disclosures about private figures and disclosures
about public figures, whether they be voluntary or involuntary. The only
wrinkle is that some facts about public figures would not be of “legitimate
public concern” were they instead about private figures. But all that means
is that certain facts about public figures—even facts that would otherwise be
“private”—are matters of legitimate public concern because of the person’s
social status. The court’s status determination, then, serves simply as a proxy
for deciding whether a particular fact is of legitimate public concern—that
would be regarded as an invasion of his purely private life”).
84. A voluntary public figure “voluntarily places himself in the public eye, by engaging in public
activities, or by assuming a prominent role in institutions or activities having general economic, cultural,
social or similar public interest, or by submitting himself or his work for public judgment.” Id. § 652D
cmt. e. Involuntary public figures, by contrast, “have not sought publicity or consented to it, but through
their own conduct or otherwise have become a legitimate subject of public interest”—“[t]hey have, in
other words, become ‘news.’” Id. § 652D cmt. f.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 21–25.
86. See, e.g., Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 157 F. Supp. 240, 241 (D. Del. 1957); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f. (noting that criminals are involuntary public figures because they
“may not only not seek publicity but may make every possible effort to avoid it”).
87. See, e.g., Jones v. Herald Post Co., 18 S.W.2d 972, 972–73 (Ky. 1929); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f; see, e.g., Jacova v. S. Radio & Television
Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 40 (Fla. 1955).
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f.
90. See id.
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is, whether it implicates the public’s ability to engage in self-governance.
This means that defining “legitimate public concern” carries a lot of
analytical weight; and indeed, a privacy claim will often rise and fall on this
determination alone. One might think that the definition is both descriptive
and circular: a matter is of legitimate public concern when the public is
concerned about the matter. The Restatement gestures at this conception
when it observes that “[i]ncluded within the scope of legitimate public
concern are matters of the kind customarily regarded as ‘news’” or matters
that have “popular appeal.”91 This descriptive definition means that, “[t]o a
considerable extent, . . . publishers and broadcasters have themselves
defined the term, as a glance at any morning paper will confirm.”92 In short,
the reporting of a fact in the news is highly probative, if not conclusive, of
its newsworthiness.
Broad deference to the news media is an idea with some constitutional
pedigree. Given that many privacy claims are brought against the press, the
vaulted status of speech on matters of public concern has sometimes been
called the “privilege to report news” or the “privilege to publicize
newsworthy matters.”93 In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the Court
barred a disclosure claim brought against a media company that reported a
rape victim’s name obtained from public court records.94 In holding that “the
press cannot be sanctioned for publishing” information found in public
documents, the Court stressed that “reliance must rest upon the judgment of
those who decide what to publish or broadcast.”95
Despite the sweeping language in some judicial opinions, the reality is
that many courts have shunned a purely descriptive definition of
newsworthiness that would yield entirely to the press. The deference is broad
but not absolute.96 Much hinges on whether the public’s interest in knowing
a particular fact is “legitimate.” The legitimacy determination, in turn,
considers “the customs and conventions of the community,” meaning that
91. Id. § 652D cmt. g.
92. Id.
93. Post, supra note 24, at 995 (quoting, respectively, Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 336 (1966) and Virgil v. Time,
Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1975)).
94. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 470, 496–97 (1975).
95. Id. at 496; see also Erin C. Carroll, Making News: Balancing Newsworthiness and Privacy in
the Age of Algorithms, 106 GEO. L.J. 69, 77–81 (2017).
96. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (“The extent of the authority to
make public private facts [about public figures] is not, however, unlimited.”).
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“what is proper becomes a matter of the community mores.”97 In the
language of the Restatement:
The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of
information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and
sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a
reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he
had no concern. The limitations, in other words, are those of common
decency, having due regard to the freedom of the press and its reasonable
leeway to choose what it will tell the public, but also due regard to the
feelings of the individual and the harm that will be done to him by the
exposure.98

These principles were at the heart of a recent blockbuster privacy
lawsuit between former wrestler Hulk Hogan and the now-defunct news
organization Gawker. Hogan sued for invasion of privacy after Gawker
published an excerpted sex tape that showed him ensconced with his best
friend’s wife. Although multiple courts refused to enjoin publication of the
tape on the grounds that it was newsworthy,99 a jury disagreed and awarded
Hogan massive damages.100 Evidently, the jury concluded that publishing
the tape amounted to “morbid and sensational prying” into Hogan’s private
life that violated “common decency,” despite Hogan’s clear status as a public
figure.101
C. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The constitutional concepts of public figures and newsworthiness have
developed in relation to a third tort: intentional infliction of emotional
distress (“IIED”). Under this tort, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
“intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that
caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.”102 When the
97. Id.; see also id. § 652D cmt. g (explaining that the media’s broad leeway to define
newsworthiness must still accord “with the mores of the community”); Amy Gajda, The Present of
Newsworthiness, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 145, 145–46 (2016).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h.
99. For background on the case, see generally Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d
1325 (M.D. Fla. 2012); Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 170 So. 3d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); Gawker
Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
100. Nick Madigan & Ravi Somaiya, Hulk Hogan Awarded $115 Million in Privacy Suit Against
Gawker, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/business/media/gawkerhulk-hogan-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/EEZ3-NYMF].
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h; see also Garner v. Triangle Publ’ns,
97 F. Supp. 546, 549–50 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
102. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011).

56

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:37

“extreme and outrageous conduct” consists of actions protected by the First
Amendment, courts have crafted rules to limit the tort’s incursion on free
speech.
The Court’s first tussle with the IIED tort came in Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, a legal battle fit—and indeed destined103—for Hollywood.104
Jerry Falwell, a nationally renowned Christian minister, sued Hustler
Magazine and its antagonistic publisher, Larry Flynt, after the magazine
spoofed an interview with Falwell in a liquor advertisement entitled “Jerry
Falwell talks about his first time.”105 A jury accepted Falwell’s claim that the
parody caused him grave emotional harm, awarding him compensatory and
punitive damages, but the Court resoundingly rejected Falwell’s claim and
extended Sullivan’s rule to IIED claims brought by public figures.106 Justice
William Rehnquist wrote for a unanimous Court that public figures must
satisfy the rigors of actual malice. The decision was grounded in the Sullivan
and Hill self-governance rationales about the need for “robust political
debate” and “the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest
and concern.”107
Portions of the Hustler decision stressed the significance of Falwell’s
social status as a public figure. The Court spoke, for instance, of the First
Amendment right to be “critical of those who hold public office or those
public figures who are ‘intimately involved in the resolution of important
public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern
to society at large.’”108 But this focus on social status faded away the next
time the Court addressed the constitutionality of an IIED claim. In Snyder v.
Phelps, the father of a soldier killed in Iraq sued parishioners from the
Westboro Baptist Church who protested near his son’s funeral, with an array
of signs, including “God Hates Fags,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and
“Priests Rape Boys.”109 The father’s leading arguments in the Supreme Court
revolved around the fact that he was a private figure who “took no action to
inject himself into a public debate” and “did nothing to obtain the status of a
celebrity or a public figure.”110
103. THE PEOPLE VS. LARRY FLYNT (Phoenix Pictures 1996).
104. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
105. Id. at 48.
106. Id. at 48, 56.
107. Id. at 50–51; see also supra notes 16–27 & 64–74 and accompanying text.
108. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 51 (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren,
C.J., concurring in result)).
109. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011).
110. Brief for Petitioner at 34, Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (No. 09-751); see also Reply
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The Court, however, was unpersuaded. Rather than focusing on the
father’s social status, the Court held that the First Amendment’s application
to the father’s claim turned on whether the parishioners’ speech was “of
public or private concern.”111 Chief Justice John Roberts explained that the
First Amendment protections are “less rigorous” when speech regulations
target matters of private concern because “[t]here is no threat to the free and
robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a
meaningful dialogue of ideas; and the threat of liability does not pose the risk
of a reaction of self-censorship on matters of public import.”112 In short, the
Court cared only about whether the underlying speech concerned issues that
the public needed to know in order to govern itself. Given the analytical
importance of determining whether speech is on a matter of public concern,
one might think that the Court would clearly define this constitutional
concept. Yet the Court candidly admitted that its boundaries “are not well
defined”113 before describing it in disjunctive—and potentially
contradictory—terms as speech that is (1) “fairly considered as relating to
any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,” or (2) “a
subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and
of value and concern to the public.”114 The definition might be descriptive
(what the public does know or wants to know) or normative (what the public
ought to know or needs to know). As applied to the father’s claim, the Court
concluded that the parishioners’ signs highlighted issues that are “matters of
public import” and as such gained First Amendment protection that blocked
liability under the IIED tort.115 The Court briefly raised the issue of
directionality, suggesting that at least two of the signs—“You’re Going to
Hell” and “God Hates You”—could be “viewed as containing messages
related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders specifically.”116 The fact that the
Court even flagged the issue of directionality might imply that speech
targeting particular people raises different constitutional considerations, but
the Court never reached this question because “the overall thrust and
dominant theme” of the signs “spoke to broader public issues.”117
Brief at 10–14, Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (No. 09-751) (arguing at length that Snyder was a
private figure, not a public one).
111. Snyder, 562 U.S at 451.
112. Id. at 452 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985)).
113. Id. at 452 (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam)).
114. Id. at 453 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 454.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Snyder, the Court’s most recent case concerning communication torts
and the First Amendment, reveals several important points about the
constitutional dynamics at play when the Court sets rules for defamation,
privacy, and IIED claims. All three regimes reflect the Court’s concern for
protecting robust public discourse—a concern animated by a selfgovernance theory of the First Amendment. This common thread runs
through the jurisprudence for all three torts, even as the rules differ slightly
between them. The Court does not disparage the state’s interests in protecting
people from harmful speech, nor does it dispute that the speech at issue in
these cases in fact inflicted harm. Rather, the Court frames the various
constitutional rules in prophylactic terms—as creating the conditions
necessary for an ecosystem in which free speech can flourish. As we’ll see,
Facebook has viewed its own rulemaking in strikingly similar terms.
II. PUBLIC FIGURES AND NEWSWORTHINESS IN NEW
GOVERNANCE: CONTENT MODERATION AND FREE SPEECH AT
FACEBOOK
Facebook is the preeminent social network of the digital age. With over
two billion users, the platform hosts vast amounts of content shared by
people scattered across the globe.118 Though we might conceive of Facebook
as a “New Governor” because of its power over online discourse, it is, of
course, a private company that need not satisfy the First Amendment when
policing its users’ speech.119 Nor is Facebook bound by any “Constitution”
of its own.120 Instead, Facebook implements a system of semi-public rules
called “Community Standards,”121 which are effectively Facebook’s “laws”
that govern what users may say on the platform.122
In order to implement the Community Standards, Facebook has
developed an immense bureaucratic system to moderate user content and
118. Company
Info,
FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM,
https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info
[https://perma.cc/G7SJ-V4E2].
119. See Klonick, supra note 5, at 1658–62. The question whether the First Amendment restricts
the government’s use of social media presents discrete doctrinal challenges that others have expertly
analyzed. See Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1979–2002 (2011) (discussing
how the public-forum doctrine might apply to when government actors use social media); Helen Norton
& Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 899, 899 (2010) (analyzing how
the government-speech doctrine might adapt given that government’s increasing reliance on social
media).
120. Though perhaps it should be. See Klonick & Kadri, supra note 5.
121. See Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards
[https://perma.cc/J7BQ-96E2].
122. DAVID KAYE, SPEECH POLICE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE TO GOVERN THE INTERNET 23 (2019).
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adjudicate disputes arising from that content. Because an enormous volume
of content is posted every day, Facebook cannot and does not proactively
police all violations of its rules. Automated detection of violations is quite
sophisticated and successful for various types of visual content (such as child
pornography) but less so for written content that poses “nuanced linguistic
challenges” (such as harassment and hate speech).123 As a result, the platform
still relies on users to reactively flag speech that might violate its rules.
Content reported by users is placed into an online queue for review by human
content moderators—people working either directly for Facebook or as
contractors who are trained to apply Facebook’s rules and determine if
content violates the Community Standards.124 The platform removes speech
found to be in violation; the rest remains.125
Facebook’s first internal guidelines for content moderation were
created largely by Dave Willner in 2009, who then joined Jud Hoffman to
spearhead a small team that formalized and consolidated the ad hoc rules that
Facebook’s earliest content moderators had been using.126 Ever since,
Facebook has devoted considerable attention to the rules and procedures it
uses to govern speech on the platform.127 Somewhat like a common-law
legal system,128 Facebook regularly adapts its Community Standards to
address changing circumstances, including new factual scenarios or
technologies; criticism or feedback from outside observers; changing norms
surrounding particular issues; and interventions from upper-level
123. See Mark Zuckerberg, A Blueprint for Content Governance and Enforcement, FACEBOOK
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-blueprint-for-content-governanceand-enforcement/10156443129621634 [https://perma.cc/P4H6-6HVQ]; see also Community Standards
Enforcement Report, FACEBOOK (Nov. 2019), https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standardsenforcement [https://perma.cc/S8FW-TXXV] (breaking down statistics for removal of nine different
types of content, including hate speech and child nudity and sexual exploitation).
124. See Klonick, supra note 5, at 1630–48. For pathbreaking work on content moderation,
particularly on the experiences of the content moderators themselves, see generally SARAH T. ROBERTS,
BEHIND THE SCREEN: CONTENT MODERATION IN THE SHADOWS OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2019). And for
excellent exploration of platform policies from sociological and legal perspectives, see generally
TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE
HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA (2018), and NICHOLAS SUZOR, LAWLESS: THE SECRET
RULES THAT GOVERN OUR DIGITAL LIVES (2019).
125. See Klonick, supra note 5, at 1630–48.
126. Telephone Interview with Jud Hoffman, Former Glob. Policy Manager, Facebook (Jan. 22,
2016); Telephone Interview with Dave Willner, Former Head of Content Policy, Facebook, & Charlotte
Willner, Former Safety Manager, User Operations, Facebook (Mar. 23, 2016). All interview notes are on
file with the authors.
127. See Klonick, supra note 5, at 1630–48.
128. See id. at 1645–47.
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management.129 Both Willner and Hoffman were heavily involved in
developing Facebook’s rules surrounding public figures and
newsworthiness—a history we turn to now.130
A. CYBERBULLYING
Whereas the Supreme Court’s public-figure doctrine emerged from
claims of defamation,131 Facebook’s rules surrounding public figures first
developed in response to claims about bullying.132 In 2009, anticyberbullying groups were pressuring Facebook to do more to protect
children from online abuse.133 The problem, however, was that traditional
academic definitions of bullying seemed impossible to translate to online
content moderation. “How do we write a rule about bullying?” recounted
Willner.134
What is bullying? What do you mean by that? It’s not just things that are
upsetting; it’s defined as a pattern of abusive or harassing unwanted
behavior over time that is occurring between a higher power [and] a lower
power. But that’s not an answer to the problem that resides in the
content—you can’t determine a power differential from looking at the
content. You often cannot even do it from looking at their profiles.135

The apparent impossibility of employing a traditional definition of
bullying meant that Facebook had to make a choice. It could err on the side
of keeping up potentially harmful content, or it could err on the side of
removing all potential acts of bullying, even if some of the removed content
turned out to be benign. Faced with intense pressure from advocacy groups
and media coverage on cyberbullying, Facebook opted for the latter
approach, but with a caveat. The new presumption in favor of removing
speech reported to be “bullying” would apply only to speech directed at
129. See, e.g., Simon Adler, Post No Evil, WNYC STUDIOS: RADIOLAB (Aug. 17, 2018),
https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/post-no-evil [https://perma.cc/J54X-5CWA]; Sheera Frenkel et al.,
Delay, Deny and Deflect: How Facebook’s Leaders Fought Through Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://nyti.ms/2DlsGPi [https://perma.cc/MD7T-LVDW].
130. The following Sections contain excerpts from research and commentary discussed in Klonick,
supra note 5, at 1604–09.
131. See supra Section I.A.
132. Telephone Interview with Jud Hoffman, Former Glob. Policy Manager, Facebook (Mar. 6,
2018); Telephone Interview with Dave Willner, Former Head of Content Policy, Facebook (Mar. 7,
2018). On the distinct complications of criminalizing cyberbullying, see Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon
Garcia, How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 MO. L. REV. 693 (2012).
133. Telephone Interview with Dave Willner, supra note 132.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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private figures. “What we said was, ‘Look, if you tell us this is about you,
and you don’t like it, and you’re a private individual—you’re not a public
figure—then we’ll take it down,’” said Hoffman.136 “Because we can’t know
whether all of those other elements [of bullying] are met, we had to just make
the call to create a default rule for removal of bullying.”137
Although Hoffman denies borrowing directly from the First
Amendment doctrine, his justification for creating this rule tracks some of
the reasoning in Sullivan and subsequent cases.138 In order to preserve robust
public discourse on the platform, Hoffman’s team made the conscious
decision to treat certain targets of allegedly harmful speech differently on
account of their social status and the public interest in their doings.139
According to Hoffman, this approach reflected Facebook’s mission
statement, which at that time was “Make the world more open and
connected.”140 “Broadly, we interpreted ‘open’ to mean ‘more content.’ Yes,
that’s a bit of a ‘free speech’ perspective, but then we also had a concern
with things like bullying and revenge porn,” Hoffman recalled.141 “But while
trying to take down that bad content, we didn’t want to make it impossible
for people to criticize the president or a person in the news. It’s important
there’s a public discussion around issues that affect people, and this is how
we drew the line.”142
In trying to resolve these dilemmas, Hoffman and his colleagues sought
to “focus on the mission” of Facebook rather than adopt “wholesale . . . a
kind of U.S. jurisprudence free-expression approach.”143 They quickly
realized, however, that the mission had to be balanced against competing
interests such as users’ safety and the company’s bottom line.144 While
Hoffman and Willner were at Facebook, the balance was often struck in
favor of “leaving content up,” but they were always searching for new ways
to address concerns about harmful speech.145 “We felt like Facebook was the
most important platform for this kind of communication, and we felt like it
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Telephone Interview with Jud Hoffman, supra note 126.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Jud Hoffman, supra note 132.
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was our responsibility to figure out an answer to this,” said Hoffman.146
The policy required a way to determine if someone was a public figure.
When a piece of content was flagged for bullying, Facebook told its
moderators to use the news aggregator Google News.147 If the person
allegedly being bullied appeared in a Google News search, moderators
would consider her a public figure—and the content would stay up.148
Although some prominent people had blue “verification” checkmarks or
“public figure” titles on their Facebook pages, these symbols were not
actually part of the metric used to determine whether someone was a public
figure under Facebook’s Community Standards.149 As Willner put it,
The blue checkmark was totally separate from the “public figure”
designation—an individual user getting a checkmark was much more
arbitrary and came from a totally different team. Ultimately, it had no
impact on how you were enforced against as a private or public figure—it
just meant that you’re one of the cool kids.150

Facebook’s use of Google News to make public-figure determinations
provided the platform with a tool that its moderators could use quickly and
consistently. The ability to implement the underlying policy on such a mass
scale was, of course, its virtue, at least in Facebook’s eyes. But it was not
without its drawbacks, as even Facebook’s policymakers recognized. If
anyone who appeared in a Google News search became a public figure, there
was no way to know whether they had voluntarily entered the public eye.
This issue often arose when people were caught up in terrible circumstances
or publicly shamed in a way that went viral. As Willner put it, “you can think
of them as involuntary public figures, but another way of saying it might be
to think of them as sympathetic public figures.”151 Whether it was fair to
apply the same bullying rules to these people was a question that Google’s
algorithm was simply unequipped to answer.
But not all involuntary public figures were plainly sympathetic.
Consider, for example, the case of Casey Anthony, who became a household
name after being accused of murdering her daughter in the “Social-Media
Trial of the Century.”152 Or recall the furor surrounding Rolling Stone’s
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
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article about an alleged rape at the University of Virginia, a story that was
later retracted and dubbed “a complete crock.”153 In both episodes, it was
difficult for Facebook to identify the “sympathetic” parties caught up in the
online firestorm that engulfed the platform, especially as the winds changed.
With Casey Anthony, Willner recalled that Facebook felt torn between
accepting the court’s “not guilty” verdict and recognizing the hard reality
that “everyone in America thinks she killed her kid.”154 Similarly, as Willner
recounted:
With the Rolling Stone story, when it starts, we believe the victims, and
that people shouldn’t say mean things about the victims, but then it turns
out all that’s not true—the victim there was actually the “bad” person. But
where along in the journey of learning about that entire story do people’s
minds shift and what do you decide to protect?155

Despite the fact Google News could hardly provide the nuance to handle
these edge cases, the company stood by its use as the best way to strike the
balance between promoting free speech and remedying harmful speech.
In moderating content related to public figures, Facebook’s
policymakers began to blur the lines between social status and
newsworthiness, just as judges have done when applying the First
Amendment to privacy torts.156 Willner reflected that “calling the exception
[an exception for] ‘public figures’ was probably a mistake—a more accurate
way of thinking about it is as a newsworthy person.”157 All that a Google
News search could tell moderators was that someone’s name had appeared
in a news source—it could not reliably reveal the person’s true social status,
the reputability of the source, the veracity of the story, or the genesis of the
controversy. This framework meant that Facebook ran into many of the same
issues that have plagued courts in defining the boundaries of
newsworthiness. As Willner recounted, he saw “newsworthiness” as
representing a normative “post-hoc judgment that applies to the content as
it’s supposed to be—to be able to accurately assess it at the time literally
Century, TIME (June 16, 2011), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2077969,00.html
[https://perma.cc/PB3Y-CLTU].
153. Erik Wemple, Charlottesville Police Make Clear that Rolling Stone Story Is a Complete Crock,
WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2015/03/23/
charlottesville-police-make-clear-that-rolling-stone-story-is-a-complete-crock [https://perma.cc/94PA532Q]; see also Ravi Somaiya, Rolling Stone Article on Rape at University of Virginia Failed All Basics,
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1NMyThP [https://perma.cc/C5ZM-ZFRM].
154. Telephone Interview with Dave Willner, supra note 132.
155. Id.
156. See supra Section I.B.
157. Telephone Interview with Dave Willner, supra note 132.
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calls for time travel.”158
Facebook’s engineers, while brilliant, had not realized that particular
Sci-Fi dream, so the platform had to settle for a descriptive concept that
included everything published in the “news.” But this approach was not
without its faults, and both Willner and Hoffman foresaw problems created
by the erosion of traditional media, the rise of self-publishing, and the
opportunities for mass amplification and virality offered by social media.
“Now that everyone is their own newsroom, it’s revealed that the emperor
has no clothes,” recounted Willner.159 “We don’t like how democratized
reporting has gotten—everyone can be their own news station, and it’s very
upsetting to people.”160 Nevertheless, given the volume of content on
Facebook and the subjectivity and unpredictability that would afflict caseby-case newsworthiness determinations, the platform saw no viable
alternative to this broad deference to an increasingly unprofessional media
ecosystem. Moderators needed a tool to make quick and mechanical
decisions, and a normative newsworthiness standard was too relative to
measure consistently. As Hoffman remarked, “When we talk about a
newsworthiness standard, what do we mean? Newsworthy to who and how
many? If you don’t establish a minimum number of people, then random
gossip is newsworthy. How is somebody sitting in one of the [Facebook]
operations places . . . going to decide that?”161 For similar reasons, both
Hoffman and Willner opposed building a general exception into the
Community Standards to prevent removal of all “newsworthy” content.
Facebook’s approach to this issue would develop on a slightly different track.
B. NEWSWORTHY CONTENT
For most of Facebook’s history, the platform made no exceptions for
content that violated Community Standards but was newsworthy.162 Overtly
sexual, graphically violent, or “extremist” content would be taken down
regardless of whether it had cultural or political significance. 163 This was a
deliberate choice made by Hoffman and Willner, but the policy came under
increasing pressure in recent years.164
158.
159.
160.
161.
2018).
162.
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164.
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Members of the policy team recall an incident in 2013 as a turning point
toward the creation of an exception for newsworthy content.165 In the wake
of the Boston Marathon bombing, a graphic image of a man in a wheelchair
began to circulate on Facebook.166 The man was being wheeled away from
the carnage, one leg ripped open below the knee to reveal a long, bloody
bone.167 What made this moderation question so fascinating was that there
were three versions of the photograph.168 One was cropped so that the leg
was not visible.169 A second was a wide-angle shot in which the leg was
visible but less obvious.170 The third, and most controversial, clearly showed
the man’s “insides on the outside”—the content-moderation team’s
shorthand rule for when content was graphically violent.171 Despite the fact
that multiple media outlets had published all three photographs, Facebook
removed any links to or images of the third version.172 “Philosophically, if
we were going to take the position that [‘insides on the outside’] was our
definition of gore and we didn’t allow gore, then just because it happened in
Boston didn’t change that,” remembers one of the team members on call that
day.173 Policy executives at Facebook disagreed, however, and reinstated all
such posts on the grounds of newsworthiness.
For some members of the policy team, who had spent years trying to
create administrable rules, the imposition of such an exception represented a
radical departure from the company’s commitment to procedural
consistency. Some of their complaints echo the Gertz Court’s rationale for
reining in the plurality’s rule in Rosenbloom.174 In his opinion for the Court
in Gertz, Justice Lewis Powell worried openly about allowing “judges to
decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of ‘general or
public interest’ and which do not.”175 Many at Facebook worried similarly
that “newsworthiness as a standard is extremely problematic: the question is
really one of ‘newsworthy to whom?’ and the answer to that is based on ideas
165.
166.
167.
168.
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170.
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of culture and popularity.”176 The result, some feared, would be a mercurial
exception that would, moreover, privilege American users’ views on
newsworthiness to the potential detriment of Facebook’s users in other
countries.177
Although there were other one-off exceptions made for incidents like
the Boston Marathon photograph, Facebook’s internal content-moderation
policies continued to have no general exception for newsworthiness until
September 2016, when a famous Norwegian author, Tom Egeland, posted a
well-known historical picture to his Facebook page.178 The photograph, “The
Terror of War,” depicts a nine-year-old Vietnamese girl naked in the street
after a napalm attack, and for this reason the photo is often called “Napalm
Girl.”179 In part because of its graphic nature, the photo was a pivotal piece
of journalism during the Vietnam War.180 Nonetheless, it violated
Facebook’s Community Standards.181 Accordingly, Facebook removed the
photo and suspended Egeland’s account. Because of Egeland’s stature, the
takedown itself received news coverage. Espen Egil Hansen, the editor-inchief of the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, published a “letter” to
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg on Aftenposten’s front page calling for
Facebook to take a stand against censorship. Hours later, Facebook’s chief
operating officer Sheryl Sandberg admitted that the company had made a
mistake and promised that the rules would be rewritten to allow for posting
of the photo.182 Shortly thereafter, Facebook issued a press release
underscoring the company’s commitment to “allowing more items that
people find newsworthy, significant, or important to the public interest—
even if they might otherwise violate [its] standards.”183
176. Telephone Interview with Anonymous, supra note 173.
177. See Adler, supra note 129.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Kate Klonick, Facebook Under Pressure, SLATE (Sept. 12, 2016, 2:48 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/09/facebook_erred_by_taking_down_the_n
apalm_girl_photo_what_happens_next.html [https://perma.cc/P2WX-YZ5U].
181. The photo was likely removed because of the nudity, not because it was child pornography.
See Kjetil Malkenes Hovland & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Backs Down on Censoring ‘Napalm Girl’
Photo, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2016, 3:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/norway-accuses-facebook-ofcensorship-over-deleted-photo-of-napalm-girl-1473428032 [https://perma.cc/5GNF-DSKD].
182. See Claire Zillman, Sheryl Sandberg Apologizes for Facebook’s ‘Napalm Girl’ Incident, TIME
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://time.com/4489370/sheryl-sandberg-napalm-girl-apology [https://perma.cc/L8ME
-Z637].
183. Joel Kaplan & Justin Osofsky, Input From Community and Partners On Our Community
Standards, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Oct. 21, 2016), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/10/input-fromcommunity-and-partners-on-our-community-standards [https://perma.cc/X48L-TYSD].

2019]

FACEBOOK V. SULLIVAN

67

The “Terror of War” incident led Facebook to start looking more
broadly at how it evaluated newsworthiness outside the context of
cyberbullying. “After the ‘Terror of War’ controversy, we realized that we
had to create new rules for imagery that we’d normally want to disallow, but
for context reasons that policy doesn’t work,” said Peter Stern, head of
Product Policy Stakeholder Engagement at Facebook.184 According to Stern,
this policy shift “led us to think about newsworthiness across the board.”185
He acknowledged that Facebook has two considerations when making
newsworthiness determinations: “Safety of individuals on the one hand and
voice on the other.”186 But what exactly does “voice” mean in this context?
Here, again, Facebook has increasingly aligned itself with the courts’ view
of the relationship between free speech and self-governance. “When
someone enters the public eye,” Stern explained, “we want to allow a broader
scope of discussion.”187
C. CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES
Over the last two years, Facebook’s content-moderation policies have
evolved to become somewhat less mechanical and more nuanced. For
example, Facebook modified its rules on bullying and harassment of public
figures in 2018. In place of its blanket rule that public figures could never
enjoy protection from bullying, the platform adopted more context-sensitive
standards to address some forms of harmful speech about prominent people.
“Our new policy does not allow certain high-intensity attacks, like calls for
death, directed at a certain public figure,” members of the Facebook policy
team reported on a recent call.188 In the past, they explained, a statement such
as “Kim Kardashian is a whore” would never be removed for bullying or
harassment (whereas a statement calling a private individual a “whore”
would be). But now, Facebook will remove some speech directed at public
figures when it is posted on their own pages or accounts, depending on the
severity of the language.189 Details of how moderators will make these
decisions are still vague, but it appears that the platform is beginning to draw
lines based on both substance (whether the speech is particularly vicious)
184. Telephone Interview with Peter Stern, Head of Prod. Policy Stakeholder Engagement,
Facebook (Mar. 7, 2018).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Televideo Interview with Idalia Gabrielow & Peter Stern, Policy Risk Team, Facebook (Aug.
15, 2018).
189. Id.
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and directionality (whether the speech is targeted to reach particular public
figures).190
Under this new regime, the platform has also tweaked its methods for
determining someone’s status as a public figure. Google News remains an
important instrument in the moderator’s toolkit—the platform will bestow
the label on people mentioned in multiple news stories within a certain
timeframe—but there are now other ways to qualify.191 Regardless of what
Google’s algorithm regurgitates, Facebook now counts among its public
figures people elected or assigned through a political process to a
government position; people with hundreds of thousands of fans or followers
on a social-media account; and people employed by a news organization or
who speak publicly.192
Facebook’s current policies on newsworthy content are somewhat
harder to pin down. Unlike the term “public figures,” which Facebook still
uses primarily for its bullying standards, “newsworthiness” is now a possible
exception to all of the company’s Community Standards.193 And unlike the
public-figure designations made in the bullying context, newsworthiness
determinations do not rely on news aggregators and algorithms.194 Instead,
Facebook employees review claims about possible newsworthy content on a
case-by-case basis.195
In deciding whether to keep up otherwise-removable content because
of its newsworthiness, Facebook officials stress that they weigh the value of
“voice” against the risk of harm.196 Assessments of harm are informed by the
nature as well as the substance of the objectionable content.197 Hateful
speech on its own, for instance, might be seen as less harmful than a direct
call to violence.198 Facebook officials maintain, however, that most of the
newsworthiness decisions relate to nudity. Difficult decisions include what
to do about nudity in public protests. “Just a few years ago, we took that
190. In this sense, Facebook and the court might again be following a similar path. See supra notes
100−01 and accompanying text.
191. Televideo Interview with Idalia Gabrielow & Peter Stern, supra note 188.
192. Id.
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197. Televideo Interview with Ruchika Budhraja, David Caragliano, Idalia Gabrielow & Peter
Stern, Policy Risk Team, Facebook (Oct. 4, 2018).
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down,” stated David Caragliano, a policy manager at Facebook. 199 “But it’s
really important to leave this up consistent with our principles of voice.
That’s led to a policy change that’s now at scale for the platform.”200 The
non-hateful, nonviolent expressive conduct of public protesters, it seems,
will today almost always be considered newsworthy and therefore will not
be taken down, even if it runs afoul of other Community Standards.
Compared to the thousands of day-to-day decisions made by hordes of
content moderators who compare content to rules, the “how” and “who”
behind Facebook’s newsworthiness determinations are more obscure. It is
unclear, for example, how a question of possible newsworthiness climbs the
Facebook policymaking ladder to become a new “policy change . . . at scale
for the platform,” let alone who makes that crucial call. 201 The lack of
transparency and accountability gives little comfort to those who worry
about the mercurial and subjective nature of newsworthiness determinations
at Facebook.
This might be about to change. In November 2018, in “A Blueprint for
Content Governance and Enforcement,” Mark Zuckerberg informed the
public that he “increasingly [has] come to believe that Facebook should not
make so many important decisions about free expression and safety on [its]
own.”202 He announced that the platform would create an “Independent
Governance and Oversight” committee to make decisions about the kinds of
content users could post on the site.203 Some have imagined this new body
as a “Supreme Court” of Facebook.204 Indeed, Zuckerberg himself used this
analogy on an April 2018 podcast:
You can imagine some sort of structure, almost like a Supreme Court, that
is made up of independent folks who don’t work for Facebook, who
ultimately make the final judgment call on what should be acceptable
speech in a community that reflects the social norms and values of people
all around the world.205
199.
200.
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The platform is now in the process of soliciting feedback on this idea and
intends to establish the tribunal by the year’s end.206
Whatever form Facebook’s Supreme Court takes, it will surely face
questions about the scope and application of Facebook’s “doctrine”
concerning public figures and newsworthiness. Actual courts, meanwhile,
will continue to grapple with these concepts and may face similar questions
as they confront challenges posed by tort claims arising from online speech.
With this in mind, Part III now considers the lessons to be learned by
comparing the public and private approaches to public figures and
newsworthiness. The constitutional law created by the Old Governors
greatly influenced the content moderation implemented by the New
Governors, and the New Governors’ experiences might now enlighten the
Old Governors in turn.
III. FACEBOOK VERSUS SULLIVAN: LESSONS FOR COURTS AND
PLATFORMS IN THE DIGITAL AGE
As we have seen, the two governance systems now used to adjudicate
complaints about harmful speech—tort lawsuits in courts and content
moderation on platforms—share some similarities. Both have developed
rules that seek to regulate harmful speech while protecting robust public
discourse that is essential to self-governance. To strike this balance, courts
and platforms have developed special rules that depend on the content of the
speech and the parties involved in the dispute. In the courts, defamation law
gives plaintiffs recourse for untruthful speech about them, but places a
substantially higher burden on plaintiffs who are public figures.207 On
Facebook, an anti-bullying policy allows users to remove malicious speech
about them, but users who are public figures can rarely avail themselves of
this option.208 In the courts, privacy and IIED law allow plaintiffs to hold
defendants liable for certain privacy invasions or outrageous conduct, except
when the underlying speech is deemed to be of legitimate public interest.209
On Facebook, users can request that disturbing content like graphically
violent or hateful speech be taken down, except when the content is of
legitimate public interest.210 Both judges and Facebook policymakers justify
these rules in similar terms, citing the importance of protecting free speech
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Zuckerberg, supra note 123.
See supra Section I.A.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Sections I.B−.C.
See supra Section II.B.
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and the legitimate public interest in discussion about people who are
powerful, famous, or at the forefront of a particular controversy.211
The observation that First Amendment concepts like public figures and
newsworthiness have wended their way into Facebook’s content-moderation
policies is interesting as a descriptive matter. It is part of a broader story
about how American laws and norms have gained influence across the globe
as these potent American companies have expanded their reach abroad. 212
Even though Facebook need not adhere to the First Amendment, its contentmoderation policies were largely developed by American lawyers trained
and acculturated in American free-speech norms, and it seems that this
cultural background has affected their thinking.213 By accurately describing
some of Facebook’s internal processes for moderating content in the way
that it does, we can better understand Facebook’s power inside and outside
of the United States—and perhaps some of the external resistance to it, as
non-Americans bristle at the exportation of foreign values. 214
But comparing these public and private governance systems provides
more than mere descriptive interest: it also teaches important lessons about
the challenges posed in the new speech ecosystem created by digital
discourse today. As an initial matter, the comparison tests intuitions about
why there are different standards concerning public figures—whether
through the courts or private platforms—and how those standards relate to
protections for newsworthy speech. With these rationales exposed, the
comparison also reveals problems with how courts and platforms have
implemented their standards for public figures and newsworthiness,
especially in an era when online speech often influences public discourse.
Finally, the comparison lays the groundwork to address some of those
problems—a task briefly undertaken in this Article’s conclusion.
211. Compare, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (justifying heightened
protection for speech about public figures because “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open”), with Telephone Interview with Peter Stern, supra note 184 (explaining that Facebook
“want[s] to allow a broader scope of discussion” once “someone enters the public eye”).
212. See Danielle Keats Citron, What to Do About the Emerging Threat of Censorship Creep on the
Internet, CATO INST. (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/what-do-aboutemerging-threat-censorship-creep-internet [https://perma.cc/ATU4-DCH6].
213. See Klonick, supra note 5, at 1621–22.
214. It is worth noting, however, that similar concepts exist in jurisprudence outside of the United
States. For various international cases dealing with these examples, see generally Campbell v. MGN Ltd.
[2004] 2 AC 457 (HL) (Eng.); Reynolds v. Times Newspapers [1999] 4 All ER 609 (HL) (Eng.); Lingens
v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407 (1986); Tammer v. Estonia, App. No. 41205/98, 37
Eur. H.R. Rep. 43 (2001); Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. HR 294.
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A. THE RATIONALES BEHIND THE RULES
As this Article has revealed so far, courts and platforms have proffered
various rationales for creating rules that protect newsworthy speech or
hamstring public figures subjected to harmful speech. Unpacking these ideas
tests intuitions about whether those rationales are both descriptively sound
and normatively desirable. This scrutiny is particularly important today as
the challenges posed by the digital age force courts to rethink old doctrines
and lead the public to demand more from the private platforms that now
govern speech online.
There have historically been three reasons why public figures have
faced harsher standards than private figures when seeking recourse for
harmful speech. The first is that public figures are supposedly “less
vulnerable” because they have greater access to “channels of effective
communication” to rebut the harmful speech.215 This rationale—which the
Court has also described as a public figure’s greater ability to perform “selfhelp”—rests on an empirical postulate: that there is a meaningful difference
between the abilities of public and private figures to engage in counterspeech that in some way redresses the harm.216 This postulate explains, at
least in part, why the Court has adopted this rationale in the defamation
context only. When the harm caused by speech stems from untruth that
tarnishes someone’s reputation, counter-speech can be an effective tool to
rebut the lie and thereby address the injury.217 But in the context of privacy
or emotional harms caused by speech, counter-speech does little to
ameliorate damage, which helps explain why a plaintiff’s status as a public
or private figure does little to change his or her legal rights when bringing
privacy or IIED claims.218 It might also explain why Facebook’s
policymakers never raise this rationale in explaining their public-figure rules
related to cyberbullying, which again involves an array of speech harms that
are not easily redressed through counter-speech.219 Indeed, both offline and
online, the harm caused by the types of speech that usually trigger privacy,
IIED, and cyberbullying concerns might actually increase with counterspeech, either by amplifying the speech through more publicity or by forcing
215. Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979).
216. Id.; see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 391 (1967) (declining to base a constitutional
rule for privacy on “the distinction . . . between the relative opportunities of the public official and the
private individual to rebut” harmful speech because defamatory speech creates a different type of harm).
217. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 164; see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defamation, Reputation, and the
Myth of Community, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996).
218. See supra Sections I.B−.C.
219. See supra Section II.A.
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a victim to re-create or re-experience the harm in order to speak out against
it.220
The second rationale for applying harsher rules to public figures is that
they are “less deserving” of protection because they assume the risk of
possible negative attention when they put themselves in the public eye.221
The Court has explained that this is a “normative” rationale that depends on
the idea of voluntariness—the harsher rule is justified because public figures,
unlike private figures, have “voluntarily exposed themselves to increased
risk of injury.”222 Once again, this reasoning appears crucial only in
defamation jurisprudence where the Court has repeatedly cabined the scope
of public-figure status by analyzing whether the plaintiff voluntarily “thrust”
herself into the vortex of a public controversy.223 (And while the Court flirted
with the idea of an “involuntary” public figure, the justices have
conspicuously left this character undefined and undiscovered in the forty
years since he or she appeared hypothetically in Gertz.224) In privacy and
IIED law, meanwhile, this rationale has no purchase: for the former, courts
draw no doctrinal distinction between voluntary and involuntary public
figures who bring claims for public disclosure of private facts; 225 for the
latter, the Court in Snyder refused to give analytical weight to the plaintiff’s
status as a private figure involuntarily caught up in a newsworthy protest.226
Facebook, too, has neglected to adopt this rationale, though it is unclear
whether this is a decision based on principle or practicality.227 Early on, some
Facebook policymakers expressed concern about how the platform’s
algorithmic approach could not test for voluntariness, yet they still adopted
that approach.228
The final reason to treat public figures differently rests on the idea that
their prominence makes them subjects of “legitimate public concern.” Under
this rationale, which hews most closely to the self-governance theory of the
220. Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 149–50 (2017)
(“Efforts to remove hurtful material typically backfire by drawing additional attention to it, intensifying
and prolonging the unwanted exposure.”).
221. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 164.
222. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
223. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979).
224. Supra note 41 and accompanying text.
225. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(commenting on voluntary public figures), with id. § 652D cmt. f (commenting on involuntary public
figures).
226. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 474–75 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
227. See Telephone Interview with Dave Willner, supra note 132.
228. Id.

74

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:37

First Amendment, the social status of public figures serves as a proxy for
their newsworthiness, and public figures thus face harsher standards for the
sake of cultivating robust public discourse.229 This justification is most
visible in the standards surrounding privacy law, which immunize disclosure
of certain sensitive facts as matters of “legitimate public concern” only when
they relate to a public figure.230 Facebook’s rules surrounding public figures
have a similar flavor. Using Google News to make status determinations
means that a person becomes a public figure on Facebook simply by
appearing in a news story. This mechanism tells the platform nothing
material about the person, aside from the fact that at least one news source
decided that the person was newsworthy. This is, of course, a purely
descriptive conception of newsworthiness—the person is newsworthy
because they appear in the news—but it nonetheless tracks the proxy
rationale to some extent.
This discussion reveals that these various rationales can take different
forms: they can be grounded in descriptive claims about public figures, such
as the notion that prominent people can more easily engage in effective selfhelp; or they can stem from normative considerations, including ideas of
fairness, risk assumption, and legitimate scope of public curiosity.
Ultimately, courts and platforms have used these descriptive and normative
rationales to craft rules aimed at creating a speech ecosystem that preserves
robust debate and protects against harmful speech. Whether they have done
so effectively is another question—one that the following Section now
attempts to answer.
B. JUDGING THE GOVERNORS, NEW AND OLD
Drawing out the comparisons between the public and private
approaches to newsworthiness and public figures can teach valuable lessons
about free speech in terms of both constitutional law and content moderation.
This Section distills three insights that should enlighten both courts and
platforms.231 Although Facebook policymakers may have channeled
doctrines created by courts, the platform’s algorithmic approach fails to
implement important normative protections baked into the courts’
229. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (explaining that, in defamation
law, public figures must satisfy a heightened burden because of their “roles of especial prominence in the
affairs of society”).
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d.
231. This Section incorporates and builds upon material in Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan,
KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/facebook-v-sullivan
[https://perma.cc/W9R8-7K9B].
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jurisprudence to justify harsher rules for public figures. Courts and platforms
should also rethink their approaches to defining public figures in light of new
phenomena created by social media, particularly given how virality alters
ideas about voluntariness. Finally, platforms could assuage concerns raised
by their ad hoc newsworthiness determinations by adopting structural
changes to become more like the court system.
1. The Inaccuracies and Injustices of Algorithmic Authority
The first lesson learned from a comparative analysis stems from
Facebook’s approach to unearthing public figures. Facebook’s use of Google
News to determine whether a person is a public figure provides a vivid
illustration of the problems raised when such definitions are outsourced
purely to the media marketplace. Although the platform has suggested that
this policy may be changing slightly, Facebook’s method for ascertaining
“public figure” status has traditionally turned on the presence or absence of
an individual’s name in news search results, which are effectively an
averaging algorithm of media outlets’ publication decisions. This runs
straight into the threat of what Clay Shirky has called “algorithmic
authority,” insofar as “an unmanaged process of extracting value from
diverse, untrustworthy sources” is treated as authoritative without any
human second-guessing or vouching for the validity of the outcome.232
As commentators have pointed out for over fifty years in a closely
related context, if “newsworthiness” is defined solely in terms of news
outlets’ publication decisions, then granting a special legal privilege for
newsworthy content is liable to swallow torts such as invasion of privacy.
“The publisher has almost certainly published any given report because he
judged it to be of interest to his audience, and believed that it would
encourage them to purchase his publications in anticipation of more of the
same,” a student comment observed in 1963.233 “A plaintiff in a privacy
action would thus have lost almost before he started.”234 Partly for this
reason, courts making these determinations have considered a range of
232. A Speculative Post on the Idea of Algorithmic Authority, CLAY SHIRKY (Nov. 15, 2009),
http://www.shirky.com/weblog/2009/11/a-speculative-post-on-the-idea-of-algorithmic-authority
[https://perma.cc/64DR-P4TP]; see also James Grimmelmann, The Platform is the Message, 2 GEO. L.
TECH. REV. 217, 217 (2018) (observing “the disturbing, demand-driven dynamics of the Internet today,
where any desire, no matter how perverse or inarticulate, can be catered to by the invisible hand of an
algorithmic media ecosystem that has no conscious idea what it is doing”).
233. Comment, The Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in the Defense of
Newsworthiness, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 722, 725 (1963).
234. Id.
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factors235 and, especially in recent years, have been unwilling to defer
entirely to the media.236 They have, in other words, refused to adopt a purely
descriptive conception of newsworthiness that abdicates definitional
responsibilities to the media.
The problems inherent in Facebook’s approach are exacerbated by two
features of the new speech ecosystem that platforms have themselves helped
create. The first is that the nature of these platforms can, in some sense, create
news, as when people become “Facebook Famous.” For example, when a
Facebook user killed a homeless man in Cleveland and then posted a video
of the murder on Facebook, it was difficult to determine where the genesis
of “publicity” begins.237 As Hoffman described, “the problem with using
Google News to determine public figure is that sometimes . . . the source of
the Google News result would be Facebook.”238 This feedback loop
undermines one potential virtue of delegating the public-figure
determination to an outside algorithm: the notion that doing so would
provide some legitimacy because it would defer to neutral sources external
to the platform. There was never an official solution during Hoffman’s tenure
on how to respond to the circular moment of a person becoming a public
figure because of their actions on the platform.239
235. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (“Deciding whether speech is of public
or private concern requires us to examine the content, form, and context of that speech, as revealed by
the whole record.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
236. See, e.g., Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation
of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1041–42 (2009) (explaining that some courts have become less
deferential to the media in determining newsworthiness, perhaps on account of “growing anxiety about
the loss of personal privacy in contemporary society” or “declining public respect for journalism”);
Sydney Ember, Gawker and Hulk Hogan Reach $31 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan-settlement.html [https://perm
a.cc/TG5X-2W62] (describing the groundbreaking jury verdict that awarded former professional wrestler
Hulk Hogan $140 million after the gossip news site Gawker.com published a sex tape featuring him). But
cf. Carroll, supra note 95, at 77–81 (discussing cases in which the courts have “largely left the role [of
determining what is newsworthy or of legitimate public interest] to the press”).
237. Jonah Engel Bromwich, Cleveland Police Seek Suspect After a Killing Seen on Facebook, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/us/facebook-live-shooting.html [https://
perma.cc/Z7JC-FW3D].
238. Telephone Interview with Jud Hoffman, supra note 132.
239. Id. Professor Enrique Armijo has argued that First Amendment law would provide a “useful
heuristic for content moderation” in this area because a “defamation defendant cannot cause a plaintiff to
become a public figure by dint of the statements that gave rise to the claim.” Enrique Armijo, Meet the
New Governors, Same as the Old Governors, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST., (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/meet-new-governors-same-old-governors [https://perma.cc/5QPYE45T]; see also Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 511, 541 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the relevant
controversy “must have existed prior to the publication of the defamatory statement”). Armijo argues that
Facebook could channel “[g]ood old-fashioned First Amendment law” to set a new rule: “if the results of
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The second—and related—problem is that Google News is a news
aggregator, not a newsroom or newspaper. Courts have justified harsher
standards for public figures because speech about them tends to be
newsworthy.240 Facebook’s approach partially adopts this proxy rationale
because a person’s appearance in the news makes them a public figure.241
But whereas judicial deference to the press has historically rested upon trust
in the press as an institution, it is difficult to ascribe the same wisdom to
Google’s algorithm. Facebook’s tactic of defining “newsworthy people”
using not the press but a news algorithm raises concerns because someone
can easily become “newsworthy” without “news judgment.” In the new
speech ecosystem brought about in part by platforms like Facebook, people
can be thrust into the public sphere and bypass the gatekeeping function of
the traditional press.242 In short, there are no editorial desks at Google
News.243
All of this creates a kind of inverse Goldilocks principle whereby
Facebook ends up removing too much benign speech and preserving too
much harmful speech. As to the former, recall that Facebook’s cyberbullying
policies traditionally meant that any user could have offensive speech about
them removed so long as they were not a public figure, and conversely all
speech about public figures would stay up.244 A purely descriptive approach
to identifying public figures means that important or influential people slip
through the cracks and remain “private” figures. News aggregators may
struggle to capture localized power or notoriety in smaller communities—an
issue made more problematic by the very nature of social media, which has
enabled virtual communities to develop their own distinctive cultures and
social structures.245 Provocative content flagged in these communities may
not seem to involve any “public figures” when judged against a global
[the Google News] search include only stories about the complained-of bullying itself, then the victim of
the bullying is a private person” and could still rely on the platform’s protections against cyberbullying.
Armijo, supra. Facebook might complain that this task will be hard for content moderators to handle at
scale, but Armijo is correct that it might provide a fairer system than one that defers entirely to Google’s
algorithm.
240. See, e.g., Rand v. Hearst Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 405, 411 (App. Div. 1969) (explaining that
privacy invasions may be justified if the plaintiff “has achieved the position of a ‘public figure’ and thus
became newsworthy” (citation omitted)).
241. Telephone Interview with Dave Willner, supra note 132.
242. See infra Sections III.B.2−.3.
243. See Amy Gajda, Newsworthiness and the Search for Norms, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Oct.
30, 2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/newsworthiness-and-search-norms [https://perma.cc/Y7
US-2NBR].
244. See supra Section II.A.
245. See BOYD, supra note 8, at 7–14.
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Google News search and therefore may be removed even if it involves a
matter of intense interest within that community.
Facebook’s algorithmic approach also prioritizes scalability over
accuracy. Even by their own admission, the platform’s policymakers knew
that it could not ascertain whether someone was being cyberbullied by
looking only at the flagged content.246 The use of Google News was thus a
haphazard way to ensure that prominent people could not use a powerful and
blunt tool to remove critical speech about them, while still allowing private
figures to remove potentially verboten content with a simple complaint.247
According to the many different Facebook employees with whom we have
spoken over the years, the vast majority of content that gets flagged for
moderators is not speech that actually violates the platform’s rules but rather
speech that certain users simply do not like.248 Making important distinctions
based on an unnuanced mechanism like Google News will inevitably lead to
false positives.
At the other end of the spectrum, Facebook’s public-figure
determinations can preserve too much harmful speech. As courts know all
too well,249 deferring to the public’s curiosity can sometimes lead to unjust
results—and Facebook’s approach effectively implements such blind
deference. It does so in two ways, all of which can be understood as being
part of a larger problem with algorithmic authority: unlike in the tort system,
there is no “normative backstop” to prevent people facing unjustly harsh
rules. First, as we discussed already, courts handling privacy claims have
increasingly refrained from allowing the media to define newsworthiness by
insisting that a disclosed fact is a matter of “legitimate” public concern.250
The idea of legitimacy in this context allows courts and juries to consider
community mores in defining newsworthiness as a way to prevent “morbid
and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake.”251 Facebook’s
approach to defining public figures contains no such limitation; indeed, it is
tough to imagine how a news algorithm could ever engage in such a complex
and context-dependent inquiry. As a result, a Facebook user might be denied
protection against cyberbullying even if he or she appeared in a news story
246. Telephone Interview with Dave Willner, supra note 132.
247. Telephone Interview with Jud Hoffman, supra note 132.
248. Telephone Interview with Dave and Charlotte Willner, supra note 126; Telephone Interview
with Jud Hoffman, supra note 126.
249. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
250. See id.
251. Id.
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(and thus became a “public figure” on the platform) that violated notions of
“common decency.”252 This might strike many as an unjust result.
Facebook’s approach lacks a second normative backstop that courts
have built into the doctrine: the voluntariness requirement from defamation
law. As we have seen, courts use the voluntariness rationale to limit harsher
rules to plaintiffs who are “less deserving” of protection against defamation
under the theory that they have assumed the risk of injury by voluntarily
entering the public eye.253 A Google News search cannot provide any such
limitation. This failing is all the more concerning because involuntary public
figures—once considered “exceedingly rare” by the Court254—are
increasingly common in the online realm.255 Countless stories exist of
relatively unknown individuals being filmed or photographed and then
finding themselves subject to widespread online shaming and related news
coverage. 256 Should such an individual report any particularly offensive
posts to Facebook for violating the company’s cyberbullying rules, the
Google News search results would indicate that the individual is a public
figure and—at least until recently—the posts would stay up. Google News
is unequipped to distinguish between situations in which people have
voluntarily “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies”257 and situations in which someone has been catapulted into
internet stardom through little or no action of their own.258 Concern about
inequitable treatment for targets of harmful speech is precisely what led the
Court in cases like Firestone to limit the class of individuals who would face
the harsher defamation rules reserved for public figures, but Facebook has
yet to respond to similar fears on its platform.259
252. See id.
253. Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
254. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
255. See infra Section III.B.2.
256. See Klonick, supra note 8, at 1044–50.
257. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
258. Not only does Facebook’s approach fail to test for voluntariness, it also features no way to
enforce the “public controversy” limitation that plays an important role in defamation law. See Silvester
v. Am. Broad. Cos., 839 F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir. 1988) (explaining that “a public controversy must be
more than merely newsworthy”).
259. Perhaps aware of the inequities built into its approach, Facebook has attempted one trick to
limit the scope of its public-figure designation: it limited the timeframe in which someone had to appear
in the news to qualify as a public figure. This approach has echoes of the courts’ treatment of “limitedpurpose” public figures, who gain the status because of their voluntary involvement in a particular public
controversy, but it is fundamentally different from the normative considerations that animate the doctrine.
Indeed, Facebook’s temporal approach creates censorship risks because important speech could be
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2. Voluntariness and Sympathy in the Age of Virality
To be charitable to Facebook, the platform’s inattention to the
constitutional concept of voluntariness might reflect a skepticism about its
normative desirability in the digital age. The Court has insisted that those
who voluntarily enter the public arena are “less deserving” of protection
because they assume the risk of negative attention,260 but this premise has
been undermined by certain features of the new speech ecosystem brought
about by platforms like Facebook. For this reason, both courts and platforms
should reform—and maybe even replace—their use of voluntariness as a
bellwether to decide which people deserve harsher rules in disputes about
harmful speech as a matter of constitutional law or content moderation.
For purposes of defamation claims, Gertz’s taxonomy splits the world
into four types of people: general public figures, who are in “positions of
such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for
all purposes”261; limited-purpose public figures, who “thrust themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved;”262 involuntary public figures, who become
famous “through no purposeful action of [their] own”263; and private figures,
who are “more vulnerable to injury” and thus “more deserving of
recovery.”264 While the first two groups “invite attention and comment”
through their own purposeful actions, the last two do not—and, as a result,
the Court has not applied the harsher constitutional rules to involuntary
public figures or private figures in defamation actions.265
The same cannot be said for privacy law, which differs from defamation
law in two important respects. First, privacy law appears to define public
figures more broadly. The Restatement squashes the general- and limitedpurpose public figure into one category—the “voluntary public figure”—and
defines a public figure as anyone who “voluntarily places [oneself] in the
public eye, by engaging in public activities, or by assuming a prominent role
removed simply because the subject of the speech has not recently been in the news. Cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“The fact that there has been a lapse of time,
even of considerable length, since the event that has made the plaintiff a public figure, does not of itself
defeat the authority to give him publicity or to renew publicity when it has formerly been given.”).
260. Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
261. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See id.
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in institutions or activities having general economic, cultural, social or
similar public interest, or by submitting [oneself] or [one’s] work for public
judgment.”266 This lacks the limitation that the Court has crafted in
defamation law that limited-purpose public figures must embroil themselves
in a “public controversy,” which the Court tellingly refused to equate with
“all controversies of interest to the public” because doing so would reinstate
the Rosenbloom rule that disavowed the significance of a plaintiff’s social
status.267 In other words, the “public controversy” requirement serves to limit
the class of public figures in a way that has no analog in privacy law, where
you can become a public figure by involving yourself in activities that have
“public interest.”268
The second difference between defamation and privacy law is that
voluntary and involuntary public figures are treated identically in privacy
law, whereas the Court has yet to clarify the constitutional consequence of
being an involuntary public figure in defamation law. It seems, however, that
the logic of the Court’s post-Gertz jurisprudence could not support equal
treatment for involuntary public figures who bring defamation claims.
Decisions like Firestone, Wolston, and Proxmire all place great weight on
the idea of voluntariness,269 which the Court has called the “normative
consideration” that justifies the harsher rules that public figures face under
defamation law.270 In Wolston, for example, the Court refused to apply the
public-figure label to the grand-jury witness who “was dragged unwillingly
into the controversy.”271 This means that Facebook’s rules for public figures
hew closer to privacy law because the platform also draws no distinction
based on voluntariness.272
To understand why the normative salience of voluntariness might have
shifted with the rise of platforms like Facebook, it is helpful to run through
a few real-world examples to test intuitions. With each example, consider
whether applying a harsher rule (in the courts or on platforms) seems fair
based on a voluntary-involuntary distinction, and indeed whether that
distinction has any influence on popular or legal intuitions. This allows
266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
267. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976); see also Silvester v. Am. Broad. Cos., 839
F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir. 1988).
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e.
269. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979); Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443
U.S. 157, 164 (1979); Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454.
270. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 164.
271. Id. at 166.
272. Telephone Interview with Dave Willner, supra note 132.
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courts and platforms to possibly reform the idea of voluntariness—and
indeed decide whether they should replace it with something else entirely.
In November 2014, a Twitter user posted a photo of a Target employee
bagging items behind a cashier.273 The employee was wearing the nametag
“Alex.”274 In one day, the tweet gained over one thousand retweets and two
thousand favorites.275 In two days, the “#AlexFromTarget” hashtag had over
a million Twitter hits and the phrase “Alex From Target” racked up more
than 200,000 Google searches.276 Before long, Twitter users managed to
identify “Alex” and unearth his Twitter account, which quickly amassed over
250,000 followers.277 Alex appeared on the Ellen talk show two days later.
Death threats, denigrating posts, and “fabricate[d] stories” about him soon
followed.278 It is hard to argue that Alex from Target, a “global celebrity”
with hundreds of thousands of social-media followers,279 is merely a private
figure. Similarly, it is hard to argue that he is a voluntary public figure who
thrust himself into the vortex of a public controversy by bagging groceries
at his part-time job.280 At most, then, he is the elusive involuntary public
figure that the Court believed was “exceedingly rare,”281 though his fleeting
internet stardom seems different from the public’s interest in the two
involuntary public figures mentioned in the Restatement—perpetrators and
victims of crimes.282
Unlike Alex from Target, some people play a more active role in
triggering the public’s attention by posting content online that then goes
viral. Consider the example of Justine Sacco, who tweeted before boarding
a flight to Cape Town: “Going to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just
kidding. I’m white!”283 The tweet went viral, and people all around the world
began following the “#HasJustineLandedYet” hashtag to track her progress
273. Alex from Target / #AlexFromTarget, KNOW YOUR MEME, https://knowyourmeme.com/
memes/alex-from-target-alexfromtarget [https://perma.cc/ASB5-GMAK].
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Nick Bilton, Alex from Target: The Other Side of Fame, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/style/alex-from-target-the-other-side-of-fame.html [https://perma.
cc/J62U-QNXF].
279. Id.
280. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979).
281. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
282. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
283. Klonick, supra note 8, at 1048–49 (citation omitted).
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as they discussed what she had said.284 When she landed in Cape Town
eleven hours later, she discovered that she was “the No. 1 worldwide trend
on Twitter” and had tens of thousands of responses to her tweet.285 The story
was picked up by several major media outlets,286 and Sacco soon lost her
job.287 As with Alex from Target, it seems strange to think of Sacco as a
private figure given her sudden worldwide fame. But whether to dub her a
“voluntary” or “involuntary” public figure is far from clear. It seems like a
stretch to say that, under defamation law, she voluntarily “thrust [herself] to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved,”288 but she might qualify as a voluntary
public figure under privacy law’s more permissive standard.289 Any
designation is further complicated by the fact that the public furor on social
media surrounding Sacco’s tweet arguably created a newsworthy event in its
own right, even if the underlying events did not.
Sacco, at least, was an adult who presumably had some sense of the
possible ramifications of her actions, even if she could not have predicted
their scale or intensity. Matters become more complicated, however, when
children become internet sensations. This can be so when they lack the
maturity to grasp the consequences of their actions, as one might think
occurred recently with students from Covington Catholic whose interaction
with a Native American activist became a huge story after videos of the
incident went viral on social media.290 As one journalist quipped in the
aftermath, “The thing to remember about the dumbass teens of Covington
Catholic is that while they are dumbasses, they are also teens.”291 Even
though the students voluntarily took part in a public march in the middle of
the nation’s capital while they knew people were filming events on their
phones, to say that they assumed the risk of such colossal negative
attention—in the way courts speak of public figures in defamation law—
284. Jon Ronson, How One Stupid Tweet Blew Up Justine Sacco’s Life, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 12,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/magazine/how-one-stupid-tweet-ruined-justine-saccoslife.html [https://perma.cc/3CD3-MY7E].
285. Id.
286. Klonick, supra note 8, 1048–49.
287. Ronson, supra note 284.
288. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
289. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
290. Mike Pesca, Covington Boys: The Difference Between Jerks and Monsters, SLATE (Jan. 24,
2019, 7:16 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/01/covington-catholic-the-scandal-that-isnt-ascandal.html [https://perma.cc/RSM2-UR6P].
291. Id.
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seems farfetched. 292
Perhaps more troubling are those children who are “thrust” into the
limelight by their parents. Six-year-old Adalia Rose Williams, for example,
gathered nearly six million Facebook fans after her mother set up a page
about her rare and fatal condition that made Williams age much faster than
normal.293 The Facebook page was a source of widespread support and
empathy, but it also drew vile abuse and even a hoax story that Williams had
died.294 Williams’s mother admitted that she was trying to raise awareness
about her daughter’s condition by placing her in the public eye. 295 Williams
was, in a sense, “thrust” into a public forum created intentionally to provoke
widespread engagement and discussion, but Williams herself did nothing to
encourage her fame. Nonetheless, whether she voluntarily or involuntarily
garnered public attention, it is hard to think of someone tracked by millions
of people as a private figure.
Finally, there are people who have chosen to be in the spotlight but who
might nonetheless seem deserving of protection against certain types of
online reactions. Take even the most obvious public figures, like actress and
comedienne Leslie Jones, who understandably spend much of their time
trying to gain public attention. Jones was inundated with racist and sexist
comments on Twitter after she starred in the all-female Ghostbusters
remake.296 In the wake of the abuse, Jones tweeted “I feel like I’m in a
personal hell. I didn’t do anything to deserve this.”297 There is no doubt that
Jones’s fame makes her a public figure under defamation and privacy law.
292. See Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979). It is true, of course, that
Covington students might not qualify as defamation public figures in the courts, despite their online fame.
See Eugene Volokh, Libel Law and the Covington Boys, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 24, 2019, 1:01 PM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2019/01/24/libel-law-and-the-covington-boys [https://perma.cc/TH9SZGWJ] (arguing that the students are still private figures because “they weren’t famous or influential
before this event” and that “just showing up at a rally would [not] qualify” as “voluntarily entering some
particular debate” to make them limited-purpose public figures).
293. Simon Tomlinson, Six-Year-Old Girl with Body of an Old Woman… Who Sings Vanilla Ice,
Dances Gangnam Style and Has Own Fan Club: Adalia Rose Suffers Rare Premature Aging Condition,
DAILY MAIL (Feb. 25, 2013, 7:06 AM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2284110/Adalia-RoseThe-year-old-girl-body-old-woman-progeria.html [https://perma.cc/C3FH-ZCGY].
294. Id.
295. Jonathan Weiss, Girl with Rare Genetic Disorder Bullied Online, MED. DAILY (Feb. 26, 2013,
3:24 PM), https://www.medicaldaily.com/girl-rare-genetic-disorder-bullied-online-244525 [https://per
ma.cc/D9CS-UNZL].
296. Anna Silman, A Timeline of Leslie Jones’s Horrific Online Abuse, THE CUT (Aug. 24, 2016),
https://www.thecut.com/2016/08/a-timeline-of-leslie-joness-horrific-online-abuse.html [https://perma.cc
/2ACG-6STU].
297. Id.

2019]

FACEBOOK V. SULLIVAN

85

But whether—as a normative matter—she deserves the harsher
cyberbullying rules that accompany public-figure status on Facebook is a far
harder question.
What can these anecdotes teach courts and platforms as they handle
disputes in the digital age? The first lesson is that the voluntary-involuntary
distinction needs reform if it is to retain normative appeal as a barometer for
how “deserving” a person is of harsher rules. A person’s viral internet fame
might make it difficult to conceive of her as a private figure, but it might also
strike us as unfair if that person’s decision to post on social media suffices
to strip that person of protection under tort law or content-moderation rules.
This intuition might stem from at least three points about life in the digital
age. First, even if a person intentionally posts online, it is not safe to presume
that he or she was intending to provoke an online firestorm and suddenly
become famous. Second, we might question whether the person truly
assumed the risk of a viral reaction and all of the baggage that can
accompany it.298 And third, it is no longer so “rare” to become involuntarily
famous with little or no “purposeful action of [his or her] own.”299 These
three points bring to mind a person walking through a forest when the heel
of her shoe sets off a spark that creates a massive forest fire. He or she may
have voluntarily taken actions in the world that led to a catastrophic incident,
but it feels wrong to say that he or she assumed that risk or deserves to be
punished for arson.300
This might mean that, in defamation law, courts should narrowly define
public figures to prevent the exception from swallowing the rule. If, as one
court has remarked, a public figure is “anyone who is famous or infamous
because of who he is or what he has done,”301 there will be far too many
public figures in this world. Courts should vigilantly apply the limitations
placed on public-figure status in defamation law, insisting that people have
voluntarily embroiled themselves in a “particular public controversy” and
298. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (explaining that public figures
“invite attention and comment” and thus have “voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood concerning them”).
299. See supra notes 257−81 and accompanying text.
300. To any graduate of an American law school, such an example might call to mind the classic
torts case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928), in which the plaintiff,
Helen Palsgraf, was waiting to board a train when another passenger stumbled while running to catch the
train, dropping a package of fireworks, which subsequently exploded and caused a large scale on the
platform to hit her. The case is typically taught to introduce the idea of foreseeability and causation as
potential limiting factors on tort liability. Foreseeability might provide insights for why we might not
want to increase the burden on the plaintiff in certain instances.
301. Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broad., Inc., 392 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1968).
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not simply been swept up in events that suddenly become “of interest to the
public.”302 At the very least, the Supreme Court should bring clarity to the
constitutional significance of being an involuntary public figure. The Court’s
post-Gertz jurisprudence suggests that such people do not deserve harsher
defamation rules, but the time has come for certainty now that they are no
longer “exceedingly rare.”
To reform privacy law, courts would need to both narrow the definition
of a voluntary public figure and distinguish between voluntary and
involuntary public figures. Under current privacy doctrine, a vast range of
people could be voluntary public figures: posting a Tweet, photo, blog post,
or status update would all seem to qualify as having “submitted [oneself] or
[one’s] work for public judgment” so as to make every human who has ever
had a social-media account a voluntary public figure.303 Even those who
refrain from social media but get mentioned on it by “engaging in public
activities” might qualify.304 If not a voluntary public figure, such hapless
individuals might be involuntary public figures, who are subject to identical
treatment under privacy law. This lack of distinction is particularly
troublesome because, as we have seen, platforms themselves have created an
environment in which virality is a feature of their products and involuntary
public figures are everywhere.305
Given the challenges posed by the digital age, perhaps the better
approach is to replace voluntariness altogether as a normative measurement.
Now that people voluntarily engage in all sorts of activities that unexpectedly
spawn virality and fame, one might question whether voluntariness is doing
the work that it once did to assess who is “less deserving” of protection
against harmful speech. Put differently, has the ease with which everyone
can now publish and amplify their speech changed the social (and perhaps
legal) significance of voluntary engagement in public debate? Moreover,
does the newfound prevalence of involuntary public figures undermine
distinctions based on voluntariness now that it is no longer “exceedingly
rare” to be thrust into the limelight against your will?
Platforms like Facebook have created an environment that reveals
problems with penalizing people for “thrusting” themselves into a “public
302. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424.U.S. 448, 453–54 (1976).
303. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
304. See id.
305. Cf. James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1137 (2009) (observing
that “Facebook offers a socially compelling platform that also facilitates peer-to-peer privacy violations”
in part because “people use Facebook with the goal of sharing information about themselves”).
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controversy.” To apply harsher rules to people who speak out risks chilling
valuable expression. This is particularly concerning when targets of harmful
speech might surrender certain protections as the price of publicly
responding to online abuse—a dynamic that risks “blaming the victim,”
heightening their vulnerability, and worsening the harm they might suffer.306
These concerns might explain why platforms like Facebook eschew
considerations of voluntariness and instead reach for other normative
concepts to judge what is “fair” in their systems of private governance. To
borrow the language of one Facebook policymaker, what might matter is
whether a person is “sympathetic.” The sympathetic public figure is often
involuntary, but not always. As Willner put it, “you can think of them as
involuntary public figures, but another way of saying it might be to think of
them as sympathetic public figures”307 because they most frequently came
up with people who were caught up in terrible circumstances or had been
publicly shamed and that shaming had gone viral.
It is unclear whether Facebook ever formalized this concept in any
actual rules, but it is nonetheless useful to consider how it might have
influenced the platform’s line-drawing in this context. Rather than using an
empirical fact as a basis for a normative conclusion—such as determining
whether somebody voluntarily invited public attention as a way to conclude
that they are “less deserving” of protection—the description of someone as
“sympathetic” skips straight to an opaque normative analysis about whether
applying the harsh rule is fair under the circumstances. This makes it a tough
standard to administer, particularly on a mass scale where such subjectivity
can breed inconsistency. But the same can be said for legal standards that
rest on community mores—such as the inquiry into whether a matter is of
“legitimate” public concern in determining its newsworthiness. Perhaps,
then, the “sympathetic” public figure is not so different from the person who,
under privacy or IIED law, must face harsher rules for the sake of ensuring
robust public discourse.
We might begin to give some shape to the concept of the sympathetic
306. For discussion of this general problem online and in other areas of law, see DANIELLE KEATS
CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 77–78 (2014); Heidi M. Hurd, Blaming the Victim: A Response
to the Proposal That Criminal Law Recognize a General Defense of Contributory Responsibility, 8 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 503, 510 (2005); Josephine Ross, Blaming the Victim: ‘Consent’ Within the Fourth
Amendment and Rape Law, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 3 (2010); JoAnne Sweeny,
Gendered Violence and Victim-Blaming: The Law’s Troubling Response to Cyber-Harassment and
Revenge Pornography, 8 INT’L J. TECHNOETHICS 18, 23 (2017).
307. Telephone Interview with Dave Willner, supra note 132.
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public figure by analyzing how it might fare better than the notion of
voluntariness in the digital age. As we have seen, voluntariness can still
influence the normative calculus in certain circumstances: Alex from Target
might eventually become a public figure following his online stardom, but it
feels odd to treat him identically to someone like Donald Trump given that
Alex did nothing (aside from being handsome while bagging groceries!) to
encourage his fame. 308 But we might also worry about how fair it is for courts
and platforms to apply harsher rules to the likes of Justine Sacco, the
Covington Catholic students, and Adalia Rose even though all of them, in
some sense, became famous through voluntary actions taken by themselves
or their legal guardians.309 What ties these three anecdotes together is that it
seems unlikely that the people involved foresaw that their actions would spur
such a significant reaction and transform them into public figures, nor would
a reasonable person have foreseen it either. It therefore seems unfair to say—
as we might in defamation law—that they are “less deserving” of protection
because they assumed the risk of becoming targets of harmful speech due to
their own voluntary actions.310
If Facebook and other platforms are serious about replacing the concept
of voluntariness with something like “sympathy,” they cannot rely on
algorithms and automation to do the job. These judgments are too nuanced
and depend on understanding context and complicated social facts, so
mechanical application of the standard will fail. Google News, then, must be
replaced or supplemented by other tools that, at least at some point in the
process, incorporate human review. Without it, platforms will run headlong
into the same problems discussed in the previous Section, whereby
algorithmic authority removes any normative backstop and implements a
purely descriptive approach. Still, this case-by-case approach is not without
its drawbacks, as we will now see.
3. The Perils of Ad Hoc Exceptions
Merely including humans in the mix is not necessarily a solution to the
problems posed by algorithmic authority and the new speech ecosystem that
platforms have helped create. Facebook’s experiences implementing its ad
hoc newsworthiness exception are proof of the perils of case-by-case
adjudication in this area. Given courts’ parallel experiences, this should
come as no surprise. Indeed, similar concerns animated the Supreme Court’s
decision to overrule Rosenbloom in Gertz, in which Justice Lewis Powell
308.
309.
310.

Bilton, supra note 278.
See supra notes 267−79 and accompanying text.
Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979).
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warned of the dangers of “forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad
hoc basis which publications address issues of ‘general or public interest’
and which do not—to determine . . . ‘what information is relevant to selfgovernment.’”311 If the Court “doubt[ed] the wisdom of committing this task
to the conscience of judges” in the court system,312 we might also worry
about Facebook executives acting similarly behind closed doors.
As things stand, Facebook and other platforms seem to deviate from
their rules if a high-ranking policymaker at the company intervenes and
determines that a piece of content is newsworthy. This overarching exception
applies to all types of content on Facebook. In the context of Napalm Girl,
for instance, Sheryl Sandberg intervened and Facebook’s rules against
nudity ultimately gave way to a determination within the platform that it was
“an iconic image of historical importance.”313 And when then-candidate
Donald Trump’s posts about his Muslim ban appeared to run afoul of
Facebook’s rules against hate speech, they stayed up after Mark Zuckerberg
and senior members of Facebook’s policy team concluded that they were
“newsworthy, significant, or important to the public interest.”314 No doubt
some newsworthiness judgments fall to policymakers who are lower on the
Facebook totem pole, but the important point is that these decisions are made
by humans—not algorithms—and often stem from company higher-ups.
Facebook’s newsworthiness exception in some ways mirrors the courts’
treatment of the same concept in privacy and IIED law. The interests served
by both torts give way to a constitutional commitment to protecting robust
discourse on matters of public concern, a determination that is often
influenced by the judgment of the press.315 But newsworthiness
determinations at Facebook are made by an anonymous and somewhat
arbitrary group of policy executives.316 This infects the adjudication process
with various problems and exposes a more systemic issue: the dearth of
accountability that a private company like Facebook has to its users, despite
impacting its users’ speech rights on the platform.
311. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
312. Id.
313. Zillman, supra note 182.
314. Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Employees Pushed to Remove Trump’s Posts as Hate Speech,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2016, 7:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-employees-pushed-toremove-trump-posts-as-hate-speech-1477075392 [https://perma.cc/63C2-LY4U].
315. See, e.g., Gajda, supra note 236, at 1041.
316. Adler, supra note 129.
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The first problem created by ad hoc exceptions at platforms is that they
might suffer from a lack of expertise or professional norms. At least in the
courts, newsworthiness determinations are often shaped by deference to the
traditional news media, where society has come to expect some level of skill,
experience, and professionalism.317 Even when tort claims do not involve a
media defendant, judges themselves are usually proficient at reading and
interpreting past decisions and deciding how they should apply in analogous
contexts. It is at best unclear if we can expect the same from Facebook
policymakers. Some may have expertise in content moderation, but others
are there to represent the platform’s business interests. Because users do not
really know who is making these decisions, they are unable to judge what
their skewed incentives might be.318 But one thing is for sure: the decisions
are currently made by Facebook insiders, and not by any neutral overseer
less likely to prioritize the company’s profits or prestige.
What little we do know about Facebook’s decisionmaking process in
this area is concerning. At least anecdotally, it seems that powerful and
connected people are more likely to get favorable treatment. This
materializes in two ways. For one, when prominent people complain about
content takedowns, the platforms seem more likely to listen. When a Danish
politician posted a photo of Copenhagen’s iconic Little Mermaid statue on
Facebook, the platform removed it for violating its nudity rules because the
image featured “too much bare skin or sexual undertones.”319 After the
politician complained publicly, Facebook backtracked and reinstated the
post.320 Similarly, after Facebook removed a post by a group of journalists
in the Philippines criticizing President Rodrigo Duterte, the group was able
to mobilize public pressure and persuade the platform to reinstate it.321
Facebook may have provided everyone with a platform, but that does not
317. Even courts might have to become more skeptical of news deference in the digital age, in which
everyone has a platform and professional norms of journalism are arguably deteriorating. See Gajda,
supra note 236, at 1041–42; cf. Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2019).
318. See Sarah C. Haan, Profits v. Principles, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/profits-v-principles [https://perma.cc/6J89-U5ND] (observing that
“[t]ensions exist between Facebook’s business interests and its aspiration to create a prosocial expressive
environment”).
319. Denmark: Facebook Blocks Little Mermaid Over ‘Bare Skin,’ BBC (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-35221329 [https://perma.cc/A69H-5XUH].
320. Id.
321. Aries Joseph Hegina, Facebook Restores Journalists’ Page with Anti-Duterte Post,
INQUIRER.NET (June 7, 2016, 11:15 AM), https://technology.inquirer.net/48270/facebook-restoresjournalists-page-with-anti-duterte-post [https://perma.cc/92S4-FCCT].
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mean that everyone is heard equally.322
The second way that platforms entrench power with the powerful is by
allowing influential people to speak in ways that the general public cannot.
Again, at least anecdotally, Facebook seems more likely to find the speech
of public figures to be newsworthy, meaning that powerful users will often
get a pass even when their content violates the platform’s rules. Zuckerberg
conceded as much when he justified the decision to treat Trump differently
because his status as a “public figure” made the posts about the Muslim ban
“newsworthy.”323 In the aftermath of that decision, Facebook announced that
it would “begin allowing more items that people find newsworthy,
significant, or important to the public interest—even if they might otherwise
violate [its] standards.”324 This preferential treatment is worsened by what
Jillian York has called the “tornadoes of celebrity,” whereby different
platforms reinforce each other in a way that creates new celebrities and then
helps them remain powerful.325
Even though Facebook has now openly said that it makes exceptions
for newsworthy content, it has given little insight into how it defines
newsworthiness. Senior Facebook executive Peter Stern has said that the
platform considers “safety of individuals on the one hand and voice on the
other,” but “voice” is a nebulous concept to say the least.326 If policymakers
are making these calls on a case-by-case basis, without the benefit of a body
of reasoned decisions from past cases, there is a risk that mere human whim
can lead to erratic and arbitrary results. Of course, a nuanced and ambiguous
standard like newsworthiness is always susceptible to inconsistent
application, but Facebook has given us little confidence that it can reliably
and fairly make these calls.
One cause for skepticism is the apparent American-centric conclusions
that Facebook has drawn in this area. As we saw, the platform was quick to
abandon its anti-gore rules to allow images of a Boston Marathon victim to
322. See Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., EFF, Human Rights Watch, and Over 70 Civil
Society Groups Ask Mark Zuckerberg to Provide All Users with Mechanism to Appeal Content
Censorship on Facebook (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-human-rights-watchand-over-70-civil-society-groups-ask-mark-zuckerberg-provide [https://perma.cc/TR6L-TERT].
323. Seetharaman, supra note 314.
324. Kaplan & Osofsky, supra note 183.
325. Jillian York, Director of Int’l Freedom of Expression, Elec. Frontier Found., Speech at the
re:publica 2018 Conference: The New Kingmakers: How Silicon Valley Created a New Culture of
Celebrity (May 6, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rl9JX5jmY0M [https://perma.cc/FGP6CDJ7].
326. Telephone Interview with Peter Stern, supra note 184.
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remain online.327 But when users made similar requests concerning videos
depicting brutal violence committed by Mexican drug cartels, the result was
quite different.328 Lower-level Facebook employees deemed the Mexican
videos newsworthy, but a high-ranking executive overruled them following
intense backlash in the media.329 The platform’s rule seemed to shift
depending on what side of the border the event occurred. Likewise, while
Trump’s Islamophobic posts about banning all Muslim immigration were
saved due to their newsworthiness, Facebook removed posts by the son of
Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu wishing that “all Muslims leave
the land of Israel.”330
This form of American exceptionalism is, in some sense, unsurprising.
Facebook is an American company run largely by Americans, so a normative
concept like newsworthiness has predictably been influenced by American
norms. Yet what makes this trend at Facebook so interesting is that it seems
contrary to how the leaders at the platform conceive of their mission. When
Zuckerberg first raised the idea of creating a “Supreme Court” for content
moderation, he extolled its virtue as a body that could “make the final
judgment call on what should be acceptable speech in a community that
reflects the social norms and values of people all around the world.”331 This
is an ambitious—and perhaps impossible—goal: the nature of norms and
values is that they often develop differently within dissimilar communities.
Facebook may wish that it could create one set of Community Standards that
would satisfy everyone within its polity, but the reality is that these global
platforms simply cannot craft policies that represent worldwide “norms and
values” that do not exist—particularly surrounding such complex and
contestable notions as the boundaries of free speech. Facebook will need to
choose the values it wants to reflect in its content moderation, but the
questions of how it will choose them and what those values might be remains
unanswered.
In sum, several lessons emerge from a comparative analysis of courts’
and platforms’ treatment of public figures and newsworthiness. For starters,
327. Adler, supra note 129.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Facebook Temporarily Bans Israeli PM’s Son Over Posts, BBC (Dec. 17, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46591270 [https://perma.cc/5FUE-KG2V]; cf. Jake
Evans, Fraser Anning’s Public Facebook Page Removed for Reported Hate Speech, ABC (Sept. 28, 2018,
12:53 AM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-09-28/fraser-annings-facebook-page-taken-down/1031
7638 [https://perma.cc/MU6M-MUHJ] (discussing Facebook’s banning of Australian politician from the
platform after he violated rules prohibiting hate speech).
331. Klein, supra note 205 (emphasis added).
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Facebook’s use of Google News for its public-figure determinations
underscores the dangers of reducing such judgments to mechanical
calculations: when followed strictly, they can result in either taking down or
keeping up too much speech. This approach, which necessarily jettisons the
“voluntariness” caveat recognized by the courts, can lead to inaccurate and
unjust results. Although Facebook and other platforms have proliferated the
once-rare “involuntary public figure” imagined in Gertz, they—and the
courts—have yet to reckon with this new reality. These issues reveal that the
new speech ecosystem created by platforms like Facebook has indeed eroded
the empirical postulate at the core of the public-figure doctrine—that is, if
you are a public figure, you have greater access to channels of
communication—now that everyone has a platform. Yet despite this
apparent equalization of speech access, the result is often less than
egalitarian. The powerful and connected often get better rules and treatment,
not all speech receives equal attention or amplification, and the mechanisms
used by Facebook to regulate speech—though increasingly transparent—
remain largely opaque and unaccountable to users. Facebook’s struggle to
create principled exceptions for newsworthy content underscores how the
company straddles the roles of the legislature, executive, judiciary, and press
in controlling access to speech for both speakers and listeners.
CONCLUSION
As this Article reveals, platforms like Facebook have fundamentally
altered the nature of the global speech ecosystem.332 They have given
everyone a platform to speak, dramatically reducing the barriers to entry in
public debate. They have facilitated the amplification of speech, allowing
users to reach broad audiences in places near and far. They have created both
opportunities and dangers by enabling virality, accelerating and extending
332. This Article has focused largely on Facebook for the purposes of comparing the private and
public modes of adjudicating claims about harmful speech. But although Facebook is currently the most
powerful and ubiquitous speech platform, it is of course just one of several players in this space. Content
moderation is a key part of many internet platforms, from online marketplaces (for example, Etsy and
Amazon) to gaming streaming (for example, Twitch and Steam), and from smaller niche communities
(for example, Ravelry and Patreon) to global speech platforms (for example, Twitter and YouTube). The
multitude of features offered by Facebook gives it a unique role in this new speech ecosystem and allows
us to analogize to the various roles played by all of these actors, making its use as a case study particularly
valuable. The lessons we can learn from Facebook’s experience will be helpful to addressing parallel
concerns raised by other online platforms. See, e.g., Twitter Will Hide Rule-Breaking Politicians’ Tweets,
BBC (June 27, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48791094 [https://perma.cc/NPJ5-6UY2]
(describing Twitter’s new policy to hide politicians’ “newsworthy” tweets that break the platform’s rules
but are left online “in the public interest”).
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the influence of speech by previously obscure people. And they have
developed a new system of governance, adjudicating the boundaries between
protecting free speech and preventing harmful speech.
In the age dominated by the Old Governors, speech governance was
essentially split between the legislature, executive, judiciary, and press.333
At least in the United States, this governance system was divided between
three branches of government, created and backed by values enshrined in the
Constitution. Congress and state legislatures would make laws, those laws
would be enforced by executive branches, and the legality of those laws
would be measured against the Constitution by courts.334 As a check against
all of this official governance was the so-called “Fourth Estate” of the press,
which enjoyed its own constitutional protection in its role as watchdog of the
government and caretaker of an informed electorate.335 The press’s decisions
of what to publish—what was “newsworthy”—were made by editorial
boards and given some deference in courts.336 Collectively, as Balkin has
argued, this was the system of “old-school speech regulation.”337
Today, in the age of the New Governors, we can see shadows of these
various roles, but in a quite different construct. Much of the governance of
online speech is done by private platforms that fulfill all of these roles—
legislature, executive, judiciary, and press—at once. At Facebook, policy
teams make rules on content, moderators enforce those rules in response to
flagged content, and escalations teams review whether those enforcements
were correct or if larger changes should be made in policy. 338 And while the
media still plays an important role in raising awareness about problematic
content-moderation rules or decisions,339 platforms are also publishers of
speech and act as editorial boards determining what types of content see the
light of day. Platforms are both the governors, setting speech policies and
adjudicating speech disputes, and the publishers, controlling access to speech
on behalf of speakers and listeners. They are the Sullivan Court, and they are
333. See Balkin, supra note 8, at 2301, 2306−08.
334. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
335. As Edmund Burke once said, “there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters
Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all.” THOMAS CARLYLE, ON
HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP, AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY 202 (John Chester Adams ed., Houghton Mifflin
& Co. 1907) (1842); see also Rachel Luberda, The Fourth Branch of the Government: Evaluating the
Media’s Role in Overseeing the Independent Judiciary, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 507,
507−10 (2008).
336. Gajda, supra note 236, at 1041–42.
337. Balkin, supra note 8, at 2298.
338. Klonick, supra note 5, at 1630–58.
339. See, e.g., Hegina, supra note 321.
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the New York Times.
Facebook seems to realize these parallels as well. Though it is just one
of many speech platforms, it is leading the way in attempting to build
accountability and oversight into its speech policies. By creating an
independent “Oversight Board” to make policy and appeals determinations
concerning the content users may post, Zuckerberg spoke directly to
concerns raised by the consolidation of power at the platform.340 Indeed, in
his blog post making the announcement, he stated that creating the tribunal
was an attempt to “prevent the concentration of too much decision-making
within [its] teams” and to “provide assurance that these decisions are made
in the best interests of [the] community and not for commercial reasons.”341
Concerns about Facebook’s incentives have led some to worry that the body
will be “more soundbite than substance,”342 but there are promising signs
that Zuckerberg will put his money where his mouth is—both literally and
figuratively. In January 2019, the platform released a few more specifics
about how the body might operate. In order to “render independent
judgment” on the platform’s speech policies, the body may “[r]everse
Facebook’s decisions when necessary.”343 According to the announcement,
members of the board “will be obligated to the people who use Facebook—
not Facebook the company.”344 Facebook even published a “Draft Charter”
340. Zuckerberg, supra note 123. The idea of such a tribunal did not spring from nowhere. Its
genesis built on years of pressure from outside groups and Facebook’s own attempts to create some form
of appellate review for content-moderation decisions. In the 2015 Manila Principles, civil-society groups
demanded that “[l]aws and content restriction policies and practices must respect due process” and
provide “[t]ransparency and accountability.” ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., MANILA PRINCIPLES ON
INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY 4−5 (2015), https://www.eff.org/files/2015/10/31/manila_principles_1.0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HNB9-F9EY]. David Kaye, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression, echoed these recommendations in his report to the Human Rights Council on free speech and
the private sector in the digital age. David Kaye, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 89, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/38 (May 11,
2016) (“It is also critical that private entities ensure the greatest possible transparency in their policies,
standards and actions that implicate the freedom of expression and other fundamental rights.”). In a
similar vein, the 2018 Santa Clara Principles declared that platforms “should provide a meaningful
opportunity for timely appeal of any content removal or account suspension” and outlined several
minimum standards that platforms should meet. THE SANTA CLARA PRINCIPLES ON TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTENT MODERATION (2018), https://santaclaraprinciples.org [https://perma.cc/
K8ZN-7SNF].
341. Zuckerberg, supra note 123.
342. douek, supra note 204.
343. Nick Clegg, Charting a Course for an Oversight Board for Content Decisions, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Jan. 28, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/01/oversight-board [https://perma.
cc/5ZA5-QG8L].
344. Id.
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for the board, which included commitments that the board would “share its
decisions transparently and give reasons for them” and that “Facebook will
accept and implement the board’s decisions.”345 Most significantly, the
Charter also revealed that the board will base its decisions not only on
Facebook’s pre-existing Community Standards, but also on “a set of values,
which will include concepts like voice, safety, equity, dignity, equality and
privacy.”346 These values, which sound akin to constitutional provisions, will
be included in a final charter “that will serve as the basis for board
governance.”347
Between January and June 2019, Facebook sought external advice on
what the Oversight Board should look like.348 Over those six months, it
“heard from more than 650 people from 88 countries represented at 22
smaller global roundtables,” gathered “feedback from more than 250 experts
in one-on-one meetings,” and established “an online ‘public consultation’
process, which encouraged users to both answer polls and submit essays on
what they thought the board should look like.”349 As one might expect from
such a global listening tour, the lengthy report released in late June
summarizing the platform’s findings raises more questions than answers.350
But it does demonstrate Facebook’s commitment to seeking out the opinions
and thoughts of users and stakeholders worldwide and providing
transparency in reporting those findings, which will hopefully influence the
Oversight Board’s final charter.351
Facebook is in the midst of its own kind of Constitutional Convention
that could fundamentally alter its nature and the way it governs online
345. FACEBOOK, DRAFT CHARTER: AN OVERSIGHT BOARD FOR CONTENT DECISIONS 1 (2019),
https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/draft-charter-oversight-board-for-content-decisions1.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH7R-YZ7P].
346. Id. at 3.
347. Id. at 5.
348. Evelyn Douek & Kate Klonick, Facebook Releases an Update on Its Oversight Board: Many
Questions, Few Answers, LAWFARE (June 27, 2019, 3:41 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/facebookreleases-update-its-oversight-board-many-questions-few-answers [https://perma.cc/7V2D-HFTV].
349. Kate Klonick & Evelyn Douek, Facebook’s Federalist Papers, SLATE (June 27, 2019, 9:44
AM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/06/facebook-oversight-board-community-standards-federalistpapers.html [https://perma.cc/BBL9-5N34].
350. Douek & Klonick, supra note 348; see also Brent Harris, Global Feedback and Input on the
Facebook Oversight Board for Content Decisions, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (June 27, 2019),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/06/global-feedback-on-oversight-board [https://perma.cc/C5PX6866].
351. For an insightful analysis of the potential benefits and limitations of Facebook’s Oversight
Board, see generally Evelyn Douek, Facebook’s “Oversight Board:” Move Fast with Stable
Infrastructure and Humility, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2019).
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speech.352 Zuckerberg seems to have finally come to terms with his
tremendous power, acknowledging that decisions about how to “balance
safety and free expression . . . are too consequential for Facebook to make
alone.”353 With the advent of an oversight body that aspires to bring
“independent judgment to hard cases,”354 the platform is on the cusp of
creating a meaningful check on its own power that could have ripple effects
throughout the industry and reshape public discourse on the internet. This
may seem hyperbolic, but Facebook’s 2.3 billion users leave a giant footprint
on the character of online speech—and the nature of the platform’s
governance over them is among the most pressing issues concerning freedom
of expression in the digital age.
Facebook’s influence over online speech makes critical oversight all the
more important. As the comparative analysis in this Article has shown,
Facebook’s approach to issues surrounding public figures and
newsworthiness raises a host of problems. The platform’s use of Google
News to determine public-figure status is purely descriptive and lacks a
normative backstop to consider concepts like voluntariness or community
mores.355 Yet if Facebook deviates from its algorithmic tools to make
exceptions based on human judgment, it risks creating arbitrary and
inconsistent results through an opaque process that is largely hidden from its
users.356 Facebook’s exceptions for newsworthy content raise similar
concerns.357 Although the platform strives vaguely to balance the “voice” of
its users against the “safety” of it users,358 when it comes to difficult issues
surrounding “sympathetic” public figures and highly contextual
newsworthiness determinations, the lack of transparent and granular
articulations of the platform’s decisions can lead to a host of problems.359
This Article has revealed the inner workings of Facebook’s content
moderation surrounding the crucial concepts of public figures and
newsworthiness. The rules and processes that the platform has adopted have
352. See generally David Pozen, Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Facebookland,
BALKINIZATION (Oct. 30, 2018), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/10/authoritarian-constitutionalismin.html [https://perma.cc/AV6K-UYSC] (observing that Facebook’s existing model is closer to
“authoritarian constitutionalism” than a “common law system,” in part because Facebook lacks “(i)
formally independent dispute resolution bodies, paradigmatically courts, that issue (ii) precedential, (iii)
written decisions”).
353. Clegg, supra note 343.
354. Id.
355. See supra Sections III.B.1−.2.
356. See supra Section III.B.3.
357. See supra Section III.B.3.
358. Telephone Interview with Peter Stern, supra note 184.
359. See supra Section III.B.3.
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deep roots in First Amendment law, but they differ in critical respects. By
comparing the old and new systems of speech governance, this Article has
exposed flaws in both. But these flaws are not fatal—both judges and
platform policymakers can change their doctrines to adapt to challenges
posed by the new speech ecosystem brought about by companies like
Facebook. The battle over how to protect free speech while regulating
harmful speech must now be fought on two fronts: through tort law in courts
and content moderation on platforms. While the Old Governors have longestablished structures to adjudicate the public’s claims, the New Governors
are still building theirs.
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